

# Boston Trust Walden Proxy Voting Guidelines

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2021 Policy Recommendations

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## INTRODUCTION

Boston Trust Walden Company understands that voting proxies of securities held in investment management accounts is a fiduciary responsibility having economic value. Our goal is to represent and vote proxies in the best long-term interest of our clients, exercising care, skill, prudence, and diligence.

The hallmark of Boston Trust Walden's investment approach is our emphasis on identifying higher quality investments with sustainable business models. We believe that environmental, social, and governance (ESG) factors are an appropriate and material part of a comprehensive analysis of long-term investment prospects. We therefore believe it is important to consider a company's ESG performance as part of our fiduciary duty to all of our clients. ESG integration describes our belief that companies protect and enhance their long term profitability if they integrate responsible behavior into the fabric of their business practices. As such, ESG considerations figure prominently in our proxy voting policies and practices as well.

A guiding principle of our voting policies is that resolutions that *reduce* shareholder rights are generally *not* supported, and conversely, resolutions that *sustain* or *increase* shareholder value and rights are supported. Another guiding principle is Boston Trust Walden's belief that resolutions calling for greater disclosure and accountability on significant financial and ESG topics are generally beneficial and in the long-term best interest of the company and its shareholders, absent any meaningful competitive reasons for limiting disclosure. These usually involve shareholder-sponsored resolutions that ask management to provide a report to investors on a specific issue.

Since December 2005, Boston Trust Walden has engaged the proxy advisory services of Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) to assist us in voting proxies, having found that its research and advice complemented our historical voting practices. Our Proxy Voting and Shareholder Engagement Committee reviews ISS recommended guidelines annually to develop, monitor, and update our customized Boston Trust Walden proxy voting guidelines that are detailed in the following pages. Using our unique guidelines, ISS recommends specific proxy votes for the shares that we hold. We then affirm or adjust the ISS application of Boston Trust Walden guidelines before they become final.

Our proxy voting guidelines serve as a general guide for proxy voting. We note there may be cases in which the final vote cast on a particular company varies from the vote guideline due to the fact that we closely examine the merits of proposals and consider relevant information and company-specific circumstances. In addition, the *potential* items addressed in the Boston Trust Walden proxy voting guidelines are far more numerous than *actual* proxy initiatives for which we cast a vote. Items that rarely appear in portfolio company proxies are often listed as a "case-by-case" decision in the guidelines. On the flip-side, any proxy item not addressed in the Boston Trust Walden guidelines are likely voted on a case-by-case basis.

Boston Trust Walden has invested considerable resources to ensure the integrity of our proxy voting process. We have also participated in shaping related public policy, such as our advocacy for greater disclosure of proxy voting policies and records or, more recently, efforts to preserve shareholders' right to file resolutions. On behalf of our clients, we have led or participated in greater than 500 shareholder resolutions since the mid-1980s. In recent years, these include resolutions encouraging major investment management firms to thoughtfully consider ESG factors in their own proxy voting practices. Overall, our actions have addressed a variety of significant environmental, social and corporate governance issues in a manner that is consistent with the long-term interests of our clients.

## 1. BOARD OF DIRECTORS

A corporation's board of directors sits at the apogee of the corporate governance system. Though they normally delegate responsibility for the management of the business to the senior executives they select and oversee, directors bear ultimate responsibility for the conduct of the corporation's business. The role of directors in publicly held corporations has undergone considerable change in recent years. Once derided as rubber stamps for management, directors of public corporations today are expected to serve as effective guardians of shareholders' interests.

Voting on directors and board-related issues is the most important use of the shareholder franchise, not simply a routine proxy item. Although uncontested director elections do not present alternative nominees from whom to choose, a high percentage of opposition votes is an expression of shareholder dissatisfaction and should be sufficient to elicit a meaningful response from management.

The role and responsibilities of directors has increasingly been the subject of much discussion and debate, given the current economic climate and the difficulties many companies now face in their respective markets. Influential organizations, including the American Law Institute, the American Bar Association, the National Association of Corporate Directors, and the Business Roundtable have issued reports and recommendations regarding the duties and accountability of corporate boards. Both mainstream and alternative media outlets have highlighted the numerous gaps within risk oversight of company boards and individual directors, and many institutional investors, in response, have capitalized on their rights as stakeholders to prompt changes. Corporations have taken notice, implementing many of the reforms championed by their shareholders.

Although differences of opinion remain, a fairly strong consensus has emerged on a number of key issues. It is widely agreed that the board's most important responsibility is to ensure that the corporation is managed in the shareholders' best long-term economic interest. This will often require boards to consider the impact of their actions on other constituencies, including employees, customers, local communities, and the environment.

- › The board's principal functions are widely agreed to consist of the following:
- › To select, evaluate, and if necessary replace management, including the chief executive officer;
- › To review and approve major strategies and financial objectives;
- › To advise management on significant issues;
- › To assure that effective controls are in place to safeguard corporate assets, manage risk, and comply with the law; and
- › To nominate directors and otherwise ensure that the board functions effectively.

Boards are expected to have a majority of directors independent of management. The independent directors are expected to organize much of the board's work, even if the chief executive officer also serves as Chairman of the board. Key committees of the board are expected to be entirely independent of management. It is expected that boards will engage in critical self-evaluation of themselves and of individual members. Individual directors, in turn, are expected to devote significant amounts of time to their duties, to limit the number of directorships they accept, and to own a meaningful amount of stock in companies on whose boards they serve. Directors are ultimately responsible to the corporation's shareholders. The most direct expression of this responsibility is the requirement that directors be elected to their positions by the shareholders. Shareholders are also asked to vote on a number of other matters regarding the role, structure, and composition of the board. Boston Trust Walden classifies directors as either inside directors, affiliated directors, or independent directors.

## 1a. Uncontested Election of Directors



**Boston Trust Walden Recommendation:** Vote on director nominees on a case-by-case basis.

Four broad principles apply when determining votes on director nominees:

1. **Board Accountability:** Accountability refers to the promotion of transparency into a company's governance practices and annual board elections and the provision to shareholders the ability to remove problematic directors and to vote on takeover defenses or other charter/bylaw amendments. These practices help reduce the opportunity for management entrenchment.
2. **Board Responsiveness:** Directors should be responsive to shareholders, particularly in regard to shareholder proposals that receive a majority vote or management proposals that receive significant opposition and to tender offers where a majority of shares are tendered. Furthermore, shareholders should expect directors to devote sufficient time and resources to oversight of the company.
3. **Director Independence:** Without independence from management, the board may be unwilling or unable to effectively set company strategy and scrutinize performance or executive compensation.
4. **Director Diversity/Competence:** Companies should seek a diverse board of directors who can add value to the board through specific skills or expertise and who can devote sufficient time and commitment to serve effectively. While directors should not be constrained by arbitrary limits such as age or term limits, directors who are unable to attend board and committee meetings and/or who are overextended (i.e. serving on too many boards) raise concern on the director's ability to effectively serve in shareholders' best interests.

### 1a-1. Board Accountability

Vote against/withhold from the entire board of directors, (except new nominees, who should be considered on a case-by-case basis) if:

#### *1a-1(a). Problematic Takeover Defenses*

##### **Classified Board Structure:**

- › The board is classified, and a continuing director responsible for a problematic governance issue at the board/committee level that would warrant an against/withhold vote recommendation is not up for election -- any or all appropriate nominees (except new) may be held accountable.

##### **Director Performance Evaluation:**

- › The board lacks accountability and oversight, coupled with sustained poor performance relative to peers. Sustained poor performance is measured by one-, three-and five-year total shareholder returns in the bottom half of a company's four-digit GICS industry group (Russell 3000 companies only). Take into consideration the company's five-year total shareholder return and five-year operational metrics. Problematic provisions include but are not limited to a classified board structure, supermajority vote requirements, a majority vote standard for director elections with no carve out for contested elections, inability for shareholders to call special meetings or act by written consent, a dual-class capital structure, and/or a non-shareholder approved poison pill.

**Poison Pills:**

- › The company's poison pill has a "dead-hand," "slowhand," or "modified dead-hand" feature. Vote against/withhold every year until this feature is removed.
- › The board adopts a poison pill with a term of more than 12 months ("long-term pill"), or renews any existing pill, including any "short-term" pill (12 months or less), without shareholder approval. A commitment or policy that puts a newly-adopted pill to a binding shareholder vote may potentially offset an adverse vote. Review such companies with classified boards yearly, and such companies with annually-elected boards at least once every three years, and vote against or withhold votes from all nominees if the company still maintains a non-shareholder-approved poison pill.
- › The board makes a material adverse change to an existing poison pill without shareholder approval.
- › Vote case-by-case on all nominees if the board adopts a poison pill with a term of 12 months or less ("short-term pill") without shareholder approval, taking into account the following factors: a) the date of the pill's adoption relative to the date of the next meeting of shareholders - i.e. whether the company had time to put the pill on ballot for shareholder ratification given the circumstances; b) the issuer's rationale; c) the issuer's governance structure and practices; and d) the issuer's track record of accountability to shareholders.

**1a-1(b). Problematic Audit-Related Practices**

Vote against/withhold from the members of the Audit Committee if:

- › The non-audit fees paid to the auditor are excessive (i.e. more than 50 percent of the total fees paid to the auditor are attributable to non-audit work);
- › The company receives an adverse opinion on the company's financial statements from its auditor; or
- › There is persuasive evidence that the audit committee entered into an inappropriate indemnification agreement with its auditor that limits the ability of the company, or its shareholders, to pursue legitimate legal recourse against the audit firm.

Vote case-by-case on members of the Audit Committee and/or the full board if poor accounting practices are identified that rise to a level of serious concern, such as; fraud, misapplication of GAAP, and material weaknesses identified in Section 404 disclosures. Examine the severity, breadth, chronological sequence, and duration of such practices, as well as the company's efforts at remediation or corrective actions, in determining whether against/withhold votes are warranted.

**1a-1(c). Problematic Compensation Practices/Pay-for-Performance Misalignment**

In the absence of an Advisory Vote on Executive Compensation ballot item, or, in egregious situations, vote against/withhold from members of the Compensation Committee and potentially the full board if:

- › There is a significant misalignment between CEO pay and company performance (see [Pay-for-Performance](#) policy);
- › The company maintains [problematic pay practices](#) including options backdating, excessive perks and overly generous employment contracts etc.;
- › The board exhibits a significant level of poor communication and responsiveness to shareholders;
- › The company reprices underwater options for stock, cash, or other consideration without prior shareholder approval, even if allowed in the firm's equity plan;
- › The company fails to include a Say on Pay ballot item when required under SEC provisions or according to the company's declared policy; or fails to include a Frequency of Pay ballot item when required under SEC provisions;
- › The company fails to submit one-time [transfers of stock options](#) to a shareholder vote; or
- › The company fails to fulfill the terms of a [burn rate commitment](#) made to shareholders.

Vote case-by-case on Compensation Committee members (or, in exceptional cases, the full board) and the Management Say-on-Pay proposal if:

- › The company's previous say-on-pay proposal received the support of less than 70 percent of votes cast, taking into account:
  - › The company's response, including: a) disclosure of engagement efforts with major institutional investors regarding the issues that contributed to the low level of support; b) specific actions taken to address the issues that contributed to the low level of support; c) other recent compensation actions taken by the company;
  - › Whether the issues raised are recurring or isolated;
  - › The company's ownership structure; and
  - › Whether the support level was less than 50 percent, which would warrant the highest degree of responsiveness.

#### ***1a-1(d). Environmental, Social and Governance (ESG) Failures***

Vote case-by-case on directors individually, committee members, or potentially the entire board, due to:

- › Material failures of governance, stewardship, risk oversight<sup>1</sup>, or fiduciary responsibilities at the company, including failure to adequately guard against or manage ESG risks;
- › Failure to replace management as appropriate; or
- › Egregious actions related to the director(s)' service on other boards that raise substantial doubt about his or her ability to effectively oversee management and serve the best interests of shareholders at any company.

#### ***1a-1(e). Unilateral Bylaw/Charter Amendments and Problematic Capital Structures***

Generally vote against or withhold from directors individually, committee members, or the entire board (except new nominees, who should be considered case-by-case) if the board amends the company's bylaws or charter without shareholder approval in a manner that materially diminishes shareholders' rights or that could adversely impact shareholders. Considering the following factors:

- › The board's rationale for adopting the bylaw/charter amendment without shareholder ratification;
- › Disclosure by the company of any significant engagement with shareholders regarding the amendment;
- › The level of impairment of shareholders' rights caused by the board's unilateral amendment to the bylaws/charter;
- › The board's track record with regard to unilateral board action on bylaw/charter amendments or other entrenchment provisions;
- › The company's ownership structure;
- › The company's existing governance provisions;
- › The timing of the board's amendment to the bylaws/charter in connection with a significant business development; and
- › Other factors, as deemed appropriate, that may be relevant to determine the impact of the amendment on shareholders.

Unless the adverse amendment is reversed or submitted to a binding shareholder vote, in subsequent years vote case-by-case on director nominees. Generally vote against (except new nominees, who should be considered case-by-case) if the directors:

- › Classified the board;
- › Adopted supermajority vote requirements to amend the bylaws or charter; or
- › Eliminated shareholders' ability to amend bylaws.

For newly public companies, generally vote against or withhold from directors individually, committee members, or the entire board (except new nominees, who should be considered case-by-case) if, prior to or in connection with the

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<sup>1</sup> Examples of failure of risk oversight include, but are not limited to: bribery; large or serial fines or sanctions from regulatory bodies; significant environmental incidents including spills and pollution; large scale or repeat workplace fatalities or injuries; significant adverse legal judgments or settlements; hedging of company stock; or significant pledging of company stock.

company's public offering, the company or its board adopted bylaw or charter provisions materially adverse to shareholder rights, or implemented a multi-class capital structure in which the classes have unequal voting rights considering the following factors:

- › The level of impairment of shareholders' rights caused by the provision;
- › The disclosed rationale;
- › The ability to change the governance structure (e.g., limitations on shareholders' right to amend the bylaws or charter, or supermajority vote requirements to amend the bylaws or charter);
- › The ability of shareholders to hold directors accountable through annual director elections, or whether the company has a classified board structure;
- › Any reasonable sunset provision; and
- › Other relevant factors.

Unless the adverse provision and/or problematic capital structure is reversed or removed, vote case-by-case on director nominees in subsequent years.

#### ***1a-1(f). Restriction of Binding Shareholder Proposals***

Generally vote against or withhold from members of the governance committee if:

- › The company's charter imposes undue restrictions on shareholders' ability to amend the bylaws. Such restrictions include, but are not limited to: outright prohibition on the submission of binding shareholder proposals, or share ownership requirements or time holding requirement in excess of SEC Rule 14a-8. Vote against on an ongoing basis.

#### **1a-2. Board Responsiveness**

Vote case-by-case on individual directors, committee members, or the entire board of directors as appropriate if:

- › The board failed to act on a shareholder proposal that received the support of a majority of the shares cast in the previous year, or failed to act on a management proposal seeking to ratify an existing charter/bylaw provision that was opposed by a majority of the shares cast in the previous year.. Factors that will be considered are:
    - › Disclosed outreach efforts by the board to shareholders in the wake of the vote;
      - › Rationale provided in the proxy statement for the level of implementation;
      - › The subject matter of the proposal;
      - › The level of support for and opposition to the resolution in past meetings;
      - › Actions taken by the board in response to the majority vote and its engagement with shareholders;
      - › The continuation of the underlying issue as a voting item on the ballot (as either shareholder or management proposals); and
      - › Other factors as appropriate.
  - › The board failed to act on takeover offers where the majority of shares are tendered;
  - › At the previous board election, any director received more than 50 percent withhold/against votes of the shares cast and the company has failed to address the issue(s) that caused the high withhold/against vote;
  - › The board implements an advisory vote on executive compensation on a less frequent basis than the frequency that received the majority of votes cast at the most recent shareholder meeting at which shareholders voted on the say-on-pay frequency; or
  - › The board implements an advisory vote on executive compensation on a less frequent basis than the frequency that received a plurality, but not a majority, of the votes cast at the most recent shareholder meeting at which shareholders voted on the say-on-pay frequency, taking into account:
    - › The board's rationale for selecting a frequency that is different from the frequency that received a plurality;
    - › The company's ownership structure and vote results;
    - › Boston Trust Walden's analysis of whether there are compensation concerns or a history of problematic compensation practices; and
    - › The previous year's support level on the company's say-on-pay proposal.
-

### 1a-3. Director Independence

Vote against/withhold from Inside Directors and Affiliated Outside Directors if the full board is less than majority independent.

Vote against/withhold from Inside Directors and Affiliated Outside Directors (per [Categorization of Directors](#)) when:

- › The inside or affiliated outside director serves on any of the three key committees; audit, compensation, or nominating;
- › The company lacks an audit, compensation, or nominating committee so that the full board functions as that committee; or
- › The company lacks a formal nominating committee, even if the board attests that the independent directors fulfill the functions of such a committee.

### 1a-4. Director Diversity/Competence

#### *Board Diversity*

Vote against /withhold from individual directors (except new nominees) who:

- › Serve as members of the nominating committee and have failed to establish at least one woman and one racially diverse director, and the board is less than 30 percent diverse. If a company has demonstrated significant progress through engagement, implementation of best practice policies and disclosure, or recent director appointments, Boston Trust Walden may support nominating committee members.

#### *Competence*

##### **Attendance at Board and Committee Meetings**

- › Generally vote against or withhold from directors (except new nominees, who should be considered case-by-case<sup>2</sup>) who attend less than 75 percent of the aggregate of their board and committee meetings for the period for which they served, unless an acceptable reason for absences is disclosed in the proxy or another SEC filing. Acceptable reasons for director absences are generally limited to the following:
  - › Medical issues/illness;
  - › Family emergencies; and
  - › If the director's total service was three meetings or fewer and the director missed only one meeting.
- › If the proxy disclosure is unclear and insufficient to determine whether a director attended at least 75 percent of the aggregate of his/her board and committee meetings during his/her period of service, vote against or withhold from the director(s) in question.

##### **Overboarded Directors**

Vote against or withhold from individual directors who:

- › Sit on more than four public company boards; or
- › Are CEOs of public companies who sit on the boards of more than one public company besides their own— withhold only at their outside boards<sup>3</sup>.

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<sup>2</sup> For new nominees only, schedule conflicts due to commitments made prior to their appointment to the board are considered if disclosed in the proxy or another SEC filing.

<sup>3</sup> Although all of a CEO's subsidiary boards will be counted as separate boards, Boston Trust Walden will not recommend a withhold vote for the CEO of a parent company board or any of the controlled (>50 percent ownership) subsidiaries of that parent, but may do so at subsidiaries that are less than 50 percent controlled and boards outside the parent/subsidiary relationships.

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## 2021 Categorization of Directors

### 1. Executive Director

- 1.1. Current officer<sup>i</sup> of the company or one of its affiliates<sup>ii</sup>.
- 1.2. Director named in the Summary Compensation Table (excluding former interim officers).

### 2. Non-Independent Non-Executive Director

#### Board Identification

- 2.1. Director identified as not independent by the board.

#### Controlling/Significant Shareholder

- 2.2. Beneficial owner of more than 50 percent of the company's voting power (this may be aggregated if voting power is distributed among more than one member of a group).

#### Current Employment at Company or Related Company

- 2.3. Non-officer employee of the firm (including employee representatives)
- 2.4. Officer<sup>i</sup>, former officer, or general or limited partner of a joint venture or partnership with the company.

#### Former Employment

- 2.5. Former CEO of the company<sup>iii,iv</sup>.
- 2.6. Former non-CEO officer<sup>i</sup> of the company or an affiliate<sup>ii</sup> within the past five years.
- 2.7. Former officer<sup>i</sup> of an acquired company within the past five years<sup>iv</sup>.
- 2.8. Officer<sup>i</sup> of a former parent of predecessor firm at the time the company was sold or split off within the past five years.
- 2.9. Former interim officer if the service was longer than 18 months. If the service was between 12 and 18 months an assessment of the interim officer's employment agreement will be made<sup>v</sup>.

#### Family Members

- 2.10. Immediate family member<sup>vi</sup> of a current or former officer<sup>i</sup> of the company or its affiliates<sup>ii</sup> within the last five years.
- 2.11. Immediate family member<sup>vi</sup> of a current employee of company or its affiliates<sup>ii</sup> where additional factors raise concern (which may include, but are not limited to, the following: a director related to numerous employees; the company or its affiliates employ relatives of numerous board members; or a non-Section 16 officer in a key strategic role).

#### Professional, Transactional, and Charitable Relationships

- 2.12. Director who (or whose immediate family member<sup>vi</sup>) currently provides professional services<sup>vii</sup> **in excess of \$10,000 per year to:** the company, to an affiliate<sup>ii</sup>, or an individual officer of the company or an affiliate; or who is (or whose immediate family member<sup>vi</sup> is) a partner, employee, or controlling shareholder of an organization which provides the services.
- 2.13. Director who (or whose immediate family member<sup>vi</sup>) currently has any material transactional relationship<sup>viii</sup> with the company or its affiliates<sup>ii</sup>; or who is (or whose immediate family member<sup>vi</sup> is) a partner in, or a controlling shareholder or an executive officer of, an organization which has the material transactional relationship<sup>viii</sup> (excluding investments in the company through a private placement).
- 2.14. Director who (or whose immediate family member<sup>vi</sup>) is a trustee, director, or employee of a charitable or non-profit organization that receives material grants or endowments<sup>viii</sup> from the company or its affiliates<sup>vii</sup>.

#### Other Relationships

- 2.15. Party to a voting agreement<sup>ix</sup> to vote in line with management on proposals being brought to shareholder vote.
- 2.16. Has (or an immediate family member<sup>vi</sup> has) an interlocking relationship as defined by the SEC involving members of the board of directors or its Compensation Committee<sup>x</sup>.
- 2.17. Founder<sup>xi</sup> of the company but not currently an employee.
- 2.18. Director with pay comparable to Named Executive Officers.
- 2.19. Any material<sup>xii</sup> relationship with the company.

### 3. Independent Director

3.1. No material<sup>iii</sup> connection to the company other than a board seat.

#### Footnotes:

<sup>i</sup> The definition of officer will generally follow that of a “Section 16 officer” (officers subject to Section 16 of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934) and includes the chief executive, operating, financial, legal, technology, and accounting officers of a company (including the president, treasurer, secretary, controller, or any vice president in charge of a principal business unit, division, or policy function). Current interim officers are included in this category. For private companies, the equivalent positions are applicable. A non-employee director serving as an officer due to statutory requirements (e.g. corporate secretary) will be classified as a Non-Independent Non-Executive Director under “Any material relationship with the company.” However, if the company provides explicit disclosure that the director is not receiving additional compensation in excess of \$10,000 per year for serving in that capacity, then the director will be classified as an Independent Director.

<sup>ii</sup> “Affiliate” includes a subsidiary, sibling company, or parent company. Boston Trust Walden uses 50 percent control ownership by the parent company as the standard for applying its affiliate designation. The manager/advisor of an externally managed issuer (EMI) is considered an affiliate.

<sup>iii</sup> Includes any former CEO of the company prior to the company’s initial public offering (IPO).

<sup>iv</sup> When there is a former CEO of a special purpose acquisition company (SPAC) serving on the board of an acquired company, Boston Trust Walden will generally classify such directors as independent unless determined otherwise taking into account the following factors: the applicable listing standards determination of such director’s independence; any operating ties to the firm; and the existence of any other conflicting relationships or related party transactions.

<sup>v</sup> Boston Trust Walden will look at the terms of the interim officer’s employment contract to determine if it contains severance pay, long-term health and pension benefits, or other such standard provisions typically contained in contracts of permanent, non-temporary CEOs. Boston Trust Walden will also consider if a formal search process was under way for a full-time officer at the time.

<sup>vi</sup> “Immediate family member” follows the SEC’s definition of such and covers spouses, parents, children, step-parents, step-children, siblings, in-laws, and any person (other than a tenant or employee) sharing the household of any director, nominee for director, executive officer, or significant shareholder of the company.

<sup>vii</sup> Professional services can be characterized as advisory in nature, generally involve access to sensitive company information or to strategic decision-making, and typically have a commission- or fee-based payment structure. Professional services generally include, but are not limited to the following: investment banking/financial advisory services; commercial banking (beyond deposit services); investment services; insurance services; accounting/audit services; consulting services; marketing services; legal services; property management services; realtor services; lobbying services; executive search services; and IT consulting services. The following would generally be considered transactional relationships and not professional services: deposit services; IT tech support services; educational services; and construction services. The case of participation in a banking syndicate by a non-lead bank should be considered a transactional (and hence subject to the associated materiality test) rather than a professional relationship. “Of Counsel” relationships are only considered immaterial if the individual does not receive any form of compensation (in excess of \$10,000 per year) from, or is a retired partner of, the firm providing the professional service. The case of a company providing a professional service to one of its directors or to an entity with which one of its directors is affiliated, will be considered a transactional rather than a professional relationship. Insurance services and marketing services are assumed to be professional services unless the company explains why such services are not advisory.

<sup>viii</sup> A material transactional relationship, including grants to non-profit organizations, exists if the company makes annual payments to, or receives annual payments from, another entity exceeding the greater of \$200,000 or 5 percent of the recipient’s gross revenues, in the case of a company which follows NASDAQ listing standards; or the greater of \$1,000,000 or 2 percent of the recipient’s gross revenues, in the case of a company which follows

NYSE listing standards. In the case of a company which follows neither of the preceding standards, Boston Trust Walden will apply the NASDAQ-based materiality test. (The recipient is the party receiving the financial proceeds from the transaction).

<sup>ix</sup> Dissident directors who are parties to a voting agreement pursuant to a settlement or similar arrangement may be classified as independent outsiders if an analysis of the following factors indicates that the voting agreement does not compromise their alignment with all shareholders' interests: the terms of the agreement; the duration of the standstill provision in the agreement; the limitations and requirements of actions that are agreed upon; if the dissident director nominee(s) is subject to the standstill; and if there any conflicting relationships or related party transactions.

<sup>x</sup> Interlocks include: executive officers serving as directors on each other's compensation or similar committees (or, in the absence of such a committee, on the board); or executive officers sitting on each other's boards and at least one serves on the other's compensation or similar committees (or, in the absence of such a committee, on the board).

<sup>xi</sup> The operating involvement of the founder with the company will be considered; if the founder was never employed by the company, Boston Trust Walden may deem him or her an independent outsider.

<sup>xii</sup> For purposes of Boston Trust Walden's director independence classification, "material" will be defined as a standard of relationship (financial, personal or otherwise) that a reasonable person might conclude could potentially influence one's objectivity in the boardroom in a manner that would have a meaningful impact on an individual's ability to satisfy requisite fiduciary standards on behalf of shareholders.

## 1b. Board-Related Management Proposals

### 1b-1. Classification/Declassification of the Board

Under a classified board structure only one class of directors would stand for election each year, and the directors in each class would generally serve three-year terms. Although proponents argue that staggered boards can provide continuity for companies at the board level, there are also a number of downsides to the structure. First, a classified board can also be used to entrench management and effectively preclude most takeover bids or proxy contests. Board classification forces dissidents and would-be acquirers to negotiate with the incumbent board, which has the authority to decide on offers without a shareholder vote. In addition, when a board is classified, it is difficult to remove individual members for either poor attendance or poor performance; shareholders would only have the chance to vote on a given director every third year when he or she comes up for election. The classified board structure can also limit shareholders' ability to withhold votes from inside directors that sit on key board committee, or to withhold votes from an entire board slate to protest the lack of board diversity. According to ISS' 2012 Board Practices study, the number of S&P 500 companies with classified boards has continued to fall. In 2015, only 17 percent of S&P 500 companies maintained staggered boards, compared to 25 percent in 2014, 30 percent in 2013, and 39 percent in 2010. While we recognize that there are some advantages to classified boards, based on the latest studies on classified boards, the fact that classified boards can make it more difficult for shareholders to remove individual directors, and the fact that classified boards can be used as an antitakeover device, Boston Trust Walden recommends against the adoption of classified boards.



#### **Boston Trust Walden Recommendation:**

- › Vote for proposals to repeal classified boards and to elect all directors annually.
- › Vote against proposals to classify (stagger) the board of directors.

### 1b-2. Majority Vote Threshold for Director Elections

- **Boston Trust Walden Recommendation:** Generally vote for management proposals to adopt a majority of votes cast standard for directors in uncontested elections.

Vote against if no carve-out for plurality in contested elections is included.

### 1b-3. Cumulative Voting

Most corporations provide that shareholders are entitled to cast one vote for each share owned. Under a cumulative voting scheme the shareholder is permitted to have one vote per share for each director to be elected. Shareholders are permitted to apportion those votes in any manner they wish among the director candidates. Shareholders have the opportunity to elect a minority representative to a board through cumulative voting, thereby ensuring representation for all sizes of shareholders. For example, if there is a company with a ten-member board and 500 shares outstanding—the total number of votes that may be cast is 5,000. In this case a shareholder with 51 shares (10.2 percent of the outstanding shares) would be guaranteed one board seat because all votes may be cast for one candidate.

- **Boston Trust Walden Recommendation:** Vote against management proposals to eliminate cumulative voting.

### 1b-4. Director and Officer Liability Protection

Management proposals typically seek shareholder approval to adopt an amendment to the company's charter to eliminate or limit the personal liability of directors to the company and its shareholders for monetary damages for any breach of fiduciary duty to the fullest extent permitted by state law. In contrast, shareholder proposals seek to provide for personal monetary liability for fiduciary breaches arising from gross negligence. While Boston Trust Walden recognizes that a company may have a more difficult time attracting and retaining directors if they are subject to personal monetary liability, Boston Trust Walden believes the great responsibility and authority of directors justifies holding them accountable for their actions. Each proposal addressing director liability will be evaluated on a case-by-case basis consistent with this philosophy using Delaware law as the standard. Boston Trust Walden may support these proposals when the company persuasively argues that such action is necessary to attract and retain directors, but may oppose management proposals and support shareholder proposals in light of promoting director accountability.

- **Boston Trust Walden Recommendation:** Vote against proposals to limit or eliminate entirely director and officer liability for monetary damages for: (i) a breach of the duty of care; (ii) acts or omissions not in good faith or involving intentional misconduct or knowing violations of the law; (iii) acts involving the unlawful purchases or redemptions of stock; (iv) the payment of unlawful dividends; or (v) the receipt of improper personal benefits.

### 1b-5. Director and Officer Indemnification

Indemnification is the payment by a company of the expenses of directors who become involved in litigation as a result of their service to a company. Proposals to indemnify a company's directors differ from those to eliminate or reduce their liability because with indemnification, directors may still be liable for an act or omission, but the company will bear the expense. Boston Trust Walden may support these proposals when the company persuasively argues that such action is necessary to attract and retain directors, but will generally oppose indemnification when it is being proposed to insulate directors from actions they have already taken.

- **Boston Trust Walden Recommendation:**
- › Vote against indemnification proposals that would expand coverage beyond just legal expenses to acts, such as negligence, that are more serious violations of fiduciary obligations than mere carelessness.
  - › Vote against proposals that would expand the scope of indemnification to provide for mandatory indemnification of company officials in connection with acts that previously the company was permitted to provide indemnification for at the discretion of the company's board (i.e., "permissive indemnification") but that previously the company was not required to indemnify.

- › Vote for only those proposals that provide such expanded coverage in cases when a director's or officer's legal defense was unsuccessful if: (i) the director was found to have acted in good faith and in a manner that the director reasonably believed was in the best interests of the company; and (ii) only if the director's legal expenses would be covered.


## 1b-6. Board Size

Proposals which would allow management to increase or decrease the size of the board at its own discretion are often used by companies as a takeover defense. Boston Trust Walden supports management proposals to fix the size of the board at a specific number, thus preventing management, when facing a proxy contest, from increasing the board size without shareholder approval. By increasing the size of the board, management can make it more difficult for dissidents to gain control of the board. Fixing the size of the board also prevents a reduction in the size of the board as a strategy to oust independent directors. Fixing board size also prevents management from increasing the number of directors in order to dilute the effects of cumulative voting.


### **Boston Trust Walden Recommendation:**

- › Vote for proposals that seek to fix the size of the board.
- › Vote case-by-case on proposals that seek to change the size or range of the board.
- › Vote against proposals that give management the ability to alter the size of the board without shareholder approval.

## 1b-7. Establish/Amend Nominee Qualifications

-  **Boston Trust Walden Recommendation:** Vote case-by-case on proposals that establish or amend director qualifications. Votes should be based on how reasonable the criteria are and to what degree they may preclude dissident nominees from joining the board.


## 1b-8. Age Limits/ Term Limits

-  **Boston Trust Walden Recommendation:** Vote case-by-case on management proposals to limit the tenure of outside directors through mandatory retirement ages or term limits as part of board refreshment.

# 1c. Board-Related Shareholder Proposals/Initiatives

## 1c-1. Proxy Contests/Proxy Access- Voting for Director Nominees in Contested Elections

Contested elections of directors frequently occur when a board candidate or slate runs for the purpose of seeking a significant change in corporate policy or control. Competing slates will be evaluated based upon the personal qualifications of the candidates, the economic impact of the policies that they advance, and their expressed and demonstrated commitment to the interests of all shareholders.


-  **Boston Trust Walden Recommendation:** Votes in a contested election of directors are evaluated on a case-by-case basis, considering the following factors:

- › Long-term financial performance of the target company relative to its industry;
- › Management's track record;
- › Background to the proxy contest;
- › Qualifications of director nominees (both slates);
- › Strategic plan of dissident slate and quality of critique against management;
- › Likelihood that the proposed goals and objectives can be achieved (both slates);

- › Stock ownership positions; and
- › Impact on stakeholders that could affect the long-term interests of shareholders, such as job loss, community lending, equal opportunity, impact on environment.

In the case of candidates nominated pursuant to proxy access, vote case-by-case considering any applicable factors listed above or additional factors which may be relevant, including those that are specific to the company, to the nominee(s) and/or to the nature of the election (such as whether or not there are more candidates than board seats).


### 1c-2. Annual Election (Declassification) of the Board

-  **Boston Trust Walden Recommendation:** Vote for shareholder proposals to repeal classified (staggered) boards and to elect all directors annually.

Vote against proposals to classify the board.

### 1c-3. Majority Threshold Voting Shareholder Proposals

A majority vote standard requires that for directors to be elected (or re-elected) to serve on the company's board they must receive support from holders of a majority of shares voted. Shareholders have expressed strong support for shareholder proposals on majority threshold voting. Boston Trust Walden believes shareholders should have a greater voice in the election of directors and believes majority threshold voting represents a viable alternative to the plurality system in the U.S. Companies are strongly encouraged to also adopt a post-election policy (also known as a director resignation policy) that will provide guidelines so that the company will promptly address the situation of a holdover director.


-  **Boston Trust Walden Recommendation:** Vote for precatory and binding resolutions requesting that the board change the company's bylaws to stipulate that directors need to be elected with an affirmative majority of votes cast, provided it does not conflict with the state law where the company is incorporated. Binding resolutions need to allow for a carve-out for a plurality vote standard when there are more nominees than board seats.

### 1c-4. Cumulative Voting


-  **Boston Trust Walden Recommendation:** Vote for shareholder proposals to restore or permit cumulative voting.

### 1c-5. Independent Board Chair

One of the principle functions of the board is to monitor and evaluate the performance of the CEO. The chairperson's duty to oversee management is obviously compromised when he or she is required to monitor himself or herself. Generally Boston Trust Walden recommends a vote for shareholder proposals that would require that the position of board chair be held by an individual with no materials ties to the company other than their board seat.

-  **Boston Trust Walden Recommendation:** Vote for shareholder proposals that would require the board chair to be independent of management.


### 1c-6. Establishment of Board Committees

-  **Boston Trust Walden Recommendation:** Vote case-by-case on shareholder proposals to establish a new board committee to address broad corporate policy topics or to provide a forum for ongoing dialogue on issues such as the environment, human or labor rights, shareholder relations, occupational health and safety etc. when the formation

of such committees appears to be a potentially effective method of protecting or enhancing shareholder value. In evaluating such proposals, the following factors will be considered:

- › Existing oversight mechanisms (including current committee structure) regarding the issue for which board oversight is sought;
- › Level of disclosure regarding the issue for which board oversight is sought;
- › Company performance related to the issue for which board oversight is sought;
- › Board committee structure compared to that of other companies in its industry sector; and
- › The scope and structure of the proposal.


### 1c-7. Establish/Amend Nominee Qualifications

-  **Boston Trust Walden Recommendation:** Vote case-by-case on proposals that establish or amend director qualifications. Votes should be based on the reasonableness of the criteria and to what degree they may preclude dissident nominees from joining the board.

Vote case-by-case on shareholder resolutions seeking a director nominee candidate who possesses a particular subject matter expertise, considering:

- › The company's board committee structure, existing subject matter expertise, and board nomination provisions relative to that of its peers;
- › The company's existing board and management oversight mechanisms regarding the issue for which board oversight is sought;
- › The company's disclosure and performance relating to the issue for which board oversight is sought and any significant related controversies; and
- › The scope and structure of the proposal.


### 1c-8. Board Policy on Shareholder Engagement

-  **Boston Trust Walden Recommendation:** Vote for shareholders proposals requesting that the board establish an internal mechanism/process, which may include a committee, in order to improve communications between directors and shareholders, unless the company has the following features, as appropriate:

- › Established a communication structure that goes beyond the exchange requirements to facilitate the exchange of information between shareholders and members of the board;
- › Effectively disclosed information with respect to this structure to its shareholders;
- › The company has not ignored majority-supported shareholder proposals or a majority withhold vote on a director nominee; and
- › The company has an independent chairman or a lead director (according to Boston Trust Walden's definition). This individual must be made available for periodic consultation and direct communication with major shareholders.

### 1c-9. Proxy Access

Boston Trust Walden supports proxy access as an important shareholder right, one that is complementary to other best-practice corporate governance features. However, in the absence of a uniform standard, proposals to enact proxy access may vary widely; as such, a case-by-case approach will be undertaken in evaluating these proposals.

-  **Boston Trust Walden Recommendation:** Generally support proxy access proposals that adhere to the 3 percent ownership requirement, have reasonable holding period requirements, and do not allow for more than 25 percent of directors to be replaced. Proxy access proposals with requirements that differ from these thresholds, including

those seeking a “fix” to existing proxy access policies, will be evaluated on a case-by-case basis, taking into account, among other factors:

- › Company-specific factors; and
- › Proposal-specific factors, including:
  - › The ownership thresholds proposed in the resolution (*i.e.*, percentage and duration);
  - › The maximum proportion of directors that shareholders may nominate each year; and
  - › The method of determining which nominations should appear on the ballot if multiple shareholders submit nominations.

### 1c-10. Age Limits

- ▶ **Boston Trust Walden Recommendation:** Vote against shareholder proposals to limit the tenure of outside directors through mandatory retirement ages.

### 1c-11. CEO Succession Planning

- ▶ **Boston Trust Walden Recommendation:** Generally vote for proposals seeking disclosure on a CEO succession planning policy, considering at a minimum, the following factors:
  - › The reasonableness/scope of the request; and
  - › The company’s existing disclosure on its current CEO succession planning process.

### 1c-12. Vote No Campaigns

- ▶ **Boston Trust Walden Recommendation:** In cases where companies are targeted in connection with public “vote no” campaigns, Boston Trust Walden will evaluate director nominees on a case-by-case basis, taking into consideration the arguments submitted by shareholders and other publicly available information.

## 2. RATIFICATION OF AUDITORS

Annual election of the outside accountants is best practice standard. While it is recognized that the company is in the best position to evaluate the competence of the outside accountants, we believe that outside accountants must ultimately be accountable to shareholders. A Blue Ribbon Commission report concluded that audit committees must improve their current level of oversight of independent accountants. Given the rash of accounting misdeeds that were not detected by audit panels or auditors, shareholder ratification is an essential step in restoring investor confidence. Shareholders should have the right to weigh in on the choice of the audit firm, and all companies should put ratification on the ballot of their annual meeting. Special consideration will be given when non-audit fees exceed audit fees, as high non-audit fees can compromise the independence of the auditor. Boston Trust Walden will also monitor both auditor tenure and whether auditor ratification has been pulled from the ballot.

 **Boston Trust Walden Recommendation:** Vote for proposals to ratify auditors, unless any of the following apply:


- › The non-audit fees paid represent 25 percent or more of the total fees paid to the auditor;
- › An auditor has a financial interest in or association with the company, and is therefore not independent;
- › There is reason to believe that the independent auditor has rendered an opinion that is neither accurate nor indicative of the company's financial position; or
- › Poor accounting practices are identified that rise to a serious level of concern, such as: fraud; misapplication of GAAP; and material weaknesses identified in Section 404 disclosures.

### 2a. Auditor-Related Shareholder Proposals

#### 2a-1. Ratify Auditors/Ensure Auditor Independence


These shareholder proposals request that the board allow shareholders to ratify the company's auditor at each annual meeting. Annual ratification of the outside accountants is standard practice. While it is recognized that the company is in the best position to evaluate the competence of the outside accountants, we believe that outside accountants must ultimately be accountable to shareholders.

Given the rash of accounting irregularities that were not detected by audit panels or auditors, shareholder ratification is an essential step in restoring investor confidence. Boston Trust Walden believes that shareholders should have the ability to ratify the auditor on an annual basis.

-  **Boston Trust Walden Recommendation:**
- › Vote for shareholder proposals to allow shareholders to vote on auditor ratification.
  - › Vote case-by-case on proposals that ask a company to adopt a policy on auditor independence.
  - › Vote case-by-case on proposals that seek to limit the non-audit services provided by the company's auditor.

#### 2a-2. Auditor Rotation

To minimize any conflict of interest that may rise between the company and its auditor, Boston Trust Walden supports the rotation of auditors. Currently, SEC rules provide that partners should be rotated every five years. However, Boston Trust Walden also believes that the long tenure of audit firms at U.S. companies can be problematic.

-  **Boston Trust Walden Recommendation:** Vote case-by-case on shareholder proposals to rotate company's auditor every five years or more. Boston Trust Walden believes that proposing a rotation period less than five years is unreasonably restrictive and may negatively affect audit quality and service while increasing expense.

### 3. TAKEOVER DEFENSES / SHAREHOLDER RIGHTS

Corporate takeover attempts come in various guises. Usually, a would-be acquirer makes a direct offer to the board of directors of a targeted corporation. The bidder may offer to purchase the company for cash and/or stock. If the board approves the offer, a friendly transaction is completed and presented to shareholders for approval. If, however, the board of directors rejects the bid, the acquirer can make a tender offer for the shares directly to the targeted corporation's shareholders. Such offers are referred to as hostile tender bids.

Not wishing to wait until they are subjects of hostile takeover attempts, many corporations have adopted antitakeover measures designed to deter unfriendly bids or buy time. The most common defenses are the shareholders rights protection plan, also known as the poison pill, and charter amendments that create barriers to acceptance of hostile bids. In the U.S., poison pills do not require shareholder approval. However, shareholders must approve charter amendments, such as classified boards or supermajority vote requirements. In brief, the very existence of defensive measures can foreclose the possibility of tenders and hence, opportunities to premium prices for shareholders.

Anti-takeover statutes generally increase management's potential for insulating itself and warding off hostile takeovers that may be beneficial to shareholders. While it may be true that some boards use such devices to obtain higher bids and to enhance shareholder value, it is more likely that such provisions are used to entrench management. The majority of historical evidence on individual corporate anti-takeover measures indicates that heavily insulated companies generally realize lower returns than those having managements that are more accountable to shareholders and the market. The evidence also suggests that when states adopt their own anti-takeover devices, or endorse those employed by firms, shareholder returns are harmed. Moreover, the body of evidence appears to indicate that companies in states with the strongest anti-takeover laws experience lower returns than they would absent such statutes.

#### 3a. Takeover Defenses and Shareholder Rights-Related Management Proposals

##### 3a-1. Poison Pills (Shareholder Rights Plans)

Poison pills are corporate-sponsored financial devices that, when triggered by potential acquirers, do one or more of the following: 1) dilute the acquirer's equity holdings in the target company; 2) dilute the acquirer's voting interests in the target company; or 3) dilute the acquirer's equity holdings in the post-merger company. Poison pills generally allow shareholders to purchase shares from, or sell shares back to, the target company (flip-in pill) and/or the potential acquirer (flip-out pill) at a price far out of line with fair market value. Depending on the type of pill, the triggering event can either transfer wealth from the target company or dilute the equity holdings of current shareholders. Poison pills insulate management from the threat of a change in control and provide the target board with veto power over takeover bids. Because poison pills greatly alter the balance of power between shareholders and management, shareholders should be allowed to make their own evaluation of such plans.



**Boston Trust Walden Recommendation:** Vote case-by-case on management proposals on poison pill ratification, focusing on the features of the shareholder rights plan. Rights plans should contain the following attributes:

- › No lower than a 20% trigger, flip-in or flip-over provision;
- › A term of no more than three years;
- › No dead-hand, slow-hand, no-hand or similar feature that limits the ability of a future board to redeem the pill;
- › Shareholder redemption feature (qualifying offer clause); if the board refuses to redeem the pill 90 days after a qualifying offer is announced, 10 percent of the shares may call a special meeting or seek a written consent to vote on rescinding the pill; and

- › The rationale for adopting the pill should be thoroughly explained by the company. In examining the request for the pill, the company's existing governance structure, including: board independence, existing takeover defenses, and any problematic governance concerns should be taken into consideration.

### 3a-2. Net Operating Loss (NOL) Poison Pills/Protective Amendments

The financial crisis has prompted widespread losses in certain industries. This has resulted in previously profitable companies considering the adoption of a poison pill and/or NOL protective amendment to protect their NOL tax assets, which may be lost upon an acquisition of 5 percent of a company's shares.

When evaluating management proposals seeking to adopt NOL pills or protective amendments, the purpose behind the proposal, its terms, and the company's existing governance structure should be taken into account to assess whether the structure actively promotes board entrenchment or adequately protects shareholder rights. While Boston Trust Walden acknowledges the high estimated tax value of NOLs, which benefit shareholders, the ownership acquisition limitations contained in an NOL pill/protective amendment coupled with a company's problematic governance structure could serve as an antitakeover device.

Given the fact that shareholders will want to ensure that such an amendment does not remain in effect permanently, Boston Trust Walden will also closely review whether the pill/amendment contains a sunset provision or a commitment to cause the expiration of the NOL pill/protective amendment upon exhaustion or expiration of the NOLs.



**Boston Trust Walden Recommendation:** Vote against proposals to adopt a poison pill for the stated purpose of protecting a company's net operating losses ("NOLs") if the term of the pill would exceed the shorter of three years and the exhaustion of the NOL.

Vote case-by-case on management proposals for poison pill ratification, considering the following factors, if the term of the pill would be the shorter of three years (or less) and the exhaustion of the NOL:

- › The ownership threshold to transfer (NOL pills generally have a trigger slightly below 5%);
- › The value of the NOLs;
- › Shareholder protection mechanisms (sunset provision, or commitment to cause expiration of the pill upon exhaustion or expiration of NOLs);
- › The company's existing governance structure including: board independence, existing takeover defenses, track record of responsiveness to shareholders, and any other problematic governance concerns; and
- › Any other factors that may be applicable.

Vote against proposals to adopt a protective amendment for the stated purpose of protecting a company's net operating losses ("NOLs") if the effective term of the protective amendment would exceed the shorter of three years and the exhaustion of the NOL.

Vote case-by-case, considering the following factors, for management proposals to adopt an NOL protective amendment that would remain in effect for the shorter of three years (or less) and the exhaustion of the NOL:

- › The ownership threshold (NOL protective amendments generally prohibit stock ownership transfers that would result in a new 5-percent holder or increase the stock ownership percentage of an existing five-percent holder);
- › The value of the NOLs;
- › Shareholder protection mechanisms (sunset provision or commitment to cause expiration of the protective amendment upon exhaustion or expiration of the NOL);
- › The company's existing governance structure including: board independence, existing takeover defenses, track record of responsiveness to shareholders, and any other problematic governance concerns;
- › Any other factors that may be applicable.

### 3a-3. Supermajority Shareholder Vote Requirements

Supermajority provisions violate the principle that a simple majority of voting shares should be all that is necessary to effect change at a company.

 **Boston Trust Walden Recommendation:**

- › Vote for proposals to reduce supermajority shareholder vote requirements for charter amendments, mergers and other significant business combinations. For companies with shareholder(s) who own a significant amount of company stock, vote case-by-case, taking into account: a) ownership structure; b) quorum requirements; and c) supermajority vote requirements.
- › Vote against proposals to require a supermajority shareholder vote for charter amendments, mergers and other significant business combinations.

### 3a-4. Shareholder Ability to Call a Special Meeting

Most state corporation statutes allow shareholders to call a special meeting when they want to take action on certain matters that arise between regularly scheduled annual meetings. Sometimes this right applies only if a shareholder or a group of shareholders own a specified percentage of shares, with 10 percent being the most common. Shareholders may lose the ability to remove directors, initiate a shareholder resolution, or respond to a beneficial offer without having to wait for the next scheduled meeting if they are unable to act at a special meeting of their own calling.

 **Boston Trust Walden Recommendation:**

- › Vote for proposals that provide shareholders with the ability to call special meetings taking into account: a) shareholders' current right to call special meetings; b) minimum ownership threshold necessary to call special meetings (10% preferred); c) the inclusion of exclusionary or prohibitive language; d) investor ownership structure; and e) shareholder support of and management's response to previous shareholder proposals.
- › Vote against proposals to restrict or prohibit shareholders' ability to call special meetings.

### 3a-5. Shareholder Ability to Act by Written Consent

Consent solicitations allow shareholders to vote on and respond to shareholder and management proposals by mail without having to act at a physical meeting. A consent card is sent by mail for shareholder approval and only requires a signature for action. Some corporate bylaws require supermajority votes for consents while at others, standard annual meeting rules apply. Shareholders may lose the ability to remove directors, initiate a shareholder resolution, or respond to a beneficial offer without having to wait for the next scheduled meeting if they are unable to act at a special meeting of their own calling.

 **Boston Trust Walden Recommendation:**

- › Generally vote against proposals to restrict or prohibit shareholders' ability to take action by written consent.
- › Vote for proposals to allow or facilitate shareholder action by written consent, taking into consideration: a) shareholders' current right to act by written consent; b) consent threshold; c) the inclusion of exclusionary or prohibitive language; d) Investor ownership structure; and e) shareholder support of and management's response to previous shareholder proposals.
- › Vote case-by-case on shareholder proposals if, in addition to the considerations above, the company has the following governance and antitakeover provisions; a) an unfettered<sup>4</sup> right for shareholders to call special meetings

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<sup>4</sup> "Unfettered" means no restrictions on agenda items, no restrictions on the number of shareholders who can group together to reach the 10 percent threshold, and only reasonable limits on when a meeting can be called: no greater than 30 days after the last annual meeting and no greater than 90 prior to the next annual meeting.

at a 10 percent threshold; b) a majority vote standard in uncontested director elections; c) no non-shareholder-approved pill, and; d) an annually elected board.

### 3a-6. Advance Notice Requirements for Shareholder Proposals/Nominations

In 2008, the Delaware courts handed down two decisions, which, read together, indicate a judicial move toward a narrower interpretation of companies' advance notice bylaws. These recent court decisions have encouraged companies to take a closer look at their bylaw provisions to ensure that broad language does not provide loopholes for activist investors. Specifically, companies are including language designed to provide more detailed advance notice provisions and to ensure full disclosure of economic and voting interests in a shareholder's notice of proposals, including derivatives and hedged positions.

► **Boston Trust Walden Recommendation:** Vote case-by-case basis on advance notice proposals, giving support to those proposals that allow shareholders to submit proposals/nominations as close to the meeting date as reasonably possible and within the broadest window possible, recognizing the need to allow sufficient notice for company, regulatory and shareholder review.

To be reasonable, the company's deadline for shareholder notice of a proposal/nominations must be no earlier than 120 days prior to the anniversary of the previous year's meeting and have a submittal window of no shorter than 30 days from the beginning of the notice period (also known as a 90-120 day window). The submittal window is the period under which a shareholder must file his proposal/nominations prior to the deadline. In general, support additional efforts by companies to ensure full disclosure in regard to a proponent's economic and voting position in the company so long as the informational requirements are reasonable and aimed at providing shareholders with the necessary information to review such proposals.

### 3a-7. Fair Price Provisions

Fair price provisions were originally designed to specifically defend against the most coercive of takeover devices, the two-tiered, front-end loaded tender offer. In such a hostile takeover, the bidder offers cash for enough shares to gain control of the target. At the same time the acquirer states that once control has been obtained, the target's remaining shares will be purchased with cash, cash and securities or only securities. Since the payment offered for the remaining stock is, by design less valuable than the original offer for the controlling shares, shareholders are forced to sell out early to maximize their value. Standard fair price provisions require that, absent board or shareholder approval of the acquisition, the bidder must pay the remaining shareholders the same price for their shares that brought control.

► **Boston Trust Walden Recommendation:**

- › Vote case-by-case on proposals to adopt fair price provisions evaluating factors such as the vote required to approve the proposed acquisition, the vote required to repeal the fair price provision, and the mechanism for determining the fair price.
- › Generally, vote against fair price provisions with shareholder vote requirements greater than a majority of disinterested shares.

### 3a-8. Confidential Voting

Confidential voting, or voting by secret ballot, is one of the key structural issues in the proxy system. It ensures that all votes are based on the merits of proposals and cast in the best interests of fiduciary clients and pension plan beneficiaries. In a confidential voting system, only vote tabulators and inspectors of election may examine individual proxies and ballots; management and shareholders are given only vote totals. In an open voting system, management can determine who has voted against its nominees or proposals and then re-solicit those votes before the final vote count. As a result, shareholders can be pressured to vote with management at companies with which they maintain, or

would like to establish, a business relationship. Confidential voting also protects employee shareholders from retaliation. Shares held by employee stock ownership plans, for example, are important votes that are typically voted by employees.

► **Boston Trust Walden Recommendation:** Vote for management proposals to adopt confidential voting.

### 3a-9. Control Share Acquisition Provisions

Control share acquisition statutes function by denying shares their voting rights when they contribute to ownership in excess of certain thresholds. Voting rights for those shares exceeding ownership limits may only be restored by approval of either a majority or supermajority of disinterested shares. Thus, control share acquisition statutes effectively require a hostile bidder to put its offer to a shareholder vote or risk voting disenfranchisement if the bidder continues buying up a large block of shares.

► **Boston Trust Walden Recommendation:**

- › Vote for proposals to opt out of control share acquisition statutes unless doing so would enable the completion of a takeover that would be detrimental to shareholders.
- › Vote against proposals to amend the charter to include control share acquisition provisions.
- › Vote for proposals to restore voting rights to the control shares.

### 3a-10. Control Share Cash-Out Provisions

Control share cash-out statutes give dissident shareholders the right to "cash-out" of their position in a company at the expense of the shareholder who has taken a control position. In other words, when an investor crosses a preset threshold level, remaining shareholders are given the right to sell their shares to the acquirer, who must buy them at the highest acquiring price.

► **Boston Trust Walden Recommendation:** Vote for proposals to opt out of control share cash-out statutes.

### 3a-11. State Takeover Statutes

► **Boston Trust Walden Recommendation:** Vote case-by-case on proposals to opt in or out of state takeover statutes (including control share acquisition statutes, control share cash-out statutes, freezeout provisions, fair price provisions, stakeholder laws, poison pill endorsements, severance pay and labor contract provisions, antitakeover provisions, and disgorgement provisions).

Vote for opting into stakeholder protection statutes if they provide comprehensive protections for employees and community stakeholders. Boston Trust Walden would be less supportive of takeover statutes that only serve to protect incumbent management from accountability to shareholders and which negatively influence shareholder value.

### 3a-12. Reincorporation Proposals

► **Boston Trust Walden Recommendation:** Vote case-by-case on proposals to change a company's state of incorporation giving consideration to both financial and corporate governance concerns including the following:

- › Reasons for reincorporation;
- › Comparison of company's governance practices and provisions prior to and following the reincorporation;
- › Comparison of corporation laws of original state and destination state.

Reincorporations into "tax havens" will be given special consideration.

While a firm's country of incorporation will remain the primary basis for evaluating companies, Boston Trust Walden will generally apply U.S. policies to the extent possible with respect to issuers that file DEF 14As, 10-K annual reports, and 10-Q quarterly reports, and are thus considered domestic issuers by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). Corporations that have reincorporated outside the U.S. have found themselves subject to a combination of governance regulations and best practice standards that may not be entirely compatible with an evaluation framework based solely on country of incorporation.

### 3a-13. Amend Bylaws without Shareholder Consent



**Boston Trust Walden Recommendation:** Vote against proposals giving the board exclusive authority to amend the bylaws.

Vote for proposals giving the board the ability to amend the bylaws in addition to shareholders.

### 3a-14. Litigation Rights (including Exclusive Venue and Fee-Shifting Bylaw Provisions)

Beginning in 2011, companies began to adopt bylaw provisions intended to limit the venue for shareholder lawsuits to the jurisdiction of incorporation. More recently, companies and their advisers have proposed other types of bylaws intended to limit shareholders' litigation rights. Most notably, a May 2014 Delaware Supreme Court decision opened the door to the adoption by companies of bylaws that would require a shareholder plaintiff who sues the company unsuccessfully to pay the defendant company's litigation expenses. Although the Delaware legislature was widely expected to enact legislation limiting the applicability of the Supreme Court's decision to non-stock corporations, the legislature has not yet done so, and several publicly traded Delaware corporations have already adopted fee-shifting bylaws by way of a board resolution.

Bylaw provisions impacting shareholders' ability to bring suit against the company may include exclusive venue provisions, which provide that the state of incorporation shall be the sole venue for certain types of litigation, and fee-shifting provisions that require a shareholder who sues a company unsuccessfully to pay all litigation expenses of the defendant corporation.



**Boston Trust Walden Recommendation:** Vote case-by-case on bylaws which impact shareholders' litigation rights, taking into account factors such as:

- › The company's stated rationale for adopting such a provision;
- › Disclosure of past harm from shareholder lawsuits in which plaintiffs were unsuccessful or shareholder lawsuits outside the jurisdiction of incorporation;
- › The breadth of application of the bylaw, including the types of lawsuits to which it would apply and the definition of key terms; and
- › Governance features such as shareholders' ability to repeal the provision at a later date (including the vote standard applied when shareholders attempt to amend the bylaws) and their ability to hold directors accountable through annual director elections and a majority vote standard in uncontested elections.

Generally vote against bylaws that mandate fee-shifting whenever plaintiffs are not completely successful on the merits (i.e., in cases where the plaintiffs are partially successful).

Unilateral adoption by the board of bylaw provisions which affect shareholders' litigation rights will be evaluated under ISS's policy on [Unilateral Bylaw/Charter Amendments and Problematic Capital Structures](#).

## 3b. Takeover Defenses and Shareholder Rights-Related Shareholder Proposals

### 3b-1. Shareholder Proposals to put Pill to a Vote and/or Adopt a Pill Policy

- **Boston Trust Walden Recommendation:** Vote for shareholder proposals requesting that the company submit its poison pill to a shareholder vote or redeem it UNLESS the company has: a) a shareholder approved poison pill in place; or b) The company has adopted a policy concerning the adoption of a pill in the future specifying that the board will only adopt a shareholder rights plan if either:
- › Shareholders have approved the adoption of the plan; or
  - › The board, in its exercise of its fiduciary responsibilities, determines that it is in the best interest of shareholders under the circumstances to adopt a pill without the delay in adoption that would result from seeking stockholder approval (i.e., the “fiduciary out” provision). A poison pill adopted under this fiduciary out will be put to a shareholder ratification vote within 12 months of adoption or expire. If the pill is not approved by a majority of the votes cast on this issue, the plan will immediately terminate.

If the shareholder proposal calls for a time period of less than 12 months for shareholder ratification after adoption, vote for the proposal, but add the caveat that a vote within 12 months would be considered sufficient implementation.

### 3b-2. Reduce Supermajority Vote Requirements

Supermajority provisions violate the principle that a simple majority of voting shares should be all that is necessary to effect change regarding a company.

- **Boston Trust Walden Recommendation:**
- › Vote for shareholder proposals to lower supermajority shareholder vote requirements for charter and bylaw amendments.
  - › Vote for shareholder proposals to lower supermajority shareholder vote requirements for mergers and other significant business combinations.

### 3b-3. Remove Antitakeover Provisions

There are numerous antitakeover mechanisms available to corporations that can make takeovers prohibitively expensive for a bidder or at least guarantee that all shareholders are treated equally. The debate over antitakeover devices centers on whether these devices enhance or detract from shareholder value. One theory argues that a company’s board, when armed with these takeover protections, may use them as negotiating tools to obtain a higher premium for shareholders. The opposing view maintains that managements afforded such protection are more likely to become entrenched than to actively pursue the best interests of shareholders. Such takeover defenses also serve as obstacles to the normal functioning of the marketplace which, when operating efficiently, should replace incapable and poorly performing managements.

- **Boston Trust Walden Recommendation:** Vote for shareholder proposals that seek to remove antitakeover provisions.

### 3b-4. Reimburse Proxy Solicitation Expenses

- **Boston Trust Walden Recommendation:** Vote case-by-case on proposals to reimburse proxy solicitation expenses. When voting in conjunction with support of a dissident slate, vote for the reimbursement of all appropriate proxy solicitation expenses associated with the election.

Vote for shareholder proposals calling for the reimbursement of reasonable costs incurred in connection with nominating one or more candidates in a contested election where the following apply:

- › The election of fewer than 50 percent of the directors to be elected is contested in the election;
- › One or more of the dissident's candidates is elected;
- › Shareholders are not permitted to cumulate their votes for directors;
- › The election occurred, and the expenses were incurred, after the adoption of this bylaw.

### 3b-5. Vote Counting Procedures

**Boston Trust Walden Recommendation:** Generally support shareholder proposals requesting a vote counting standard of a simple majority of shares voted for or against.

## 4. MISCELLANEOUS GOVERNANCE PROVISIONS

### 4a. Bundled Proposals

- **Boston Trust Walden Recommendation:** Review on a case-by-case basis bundled or “conditional” proxy proposals. In the case of items that are conditioned upon each other, examine the benefits and costs of the packaged items. In instances where the joint effect of the conditioned items is not in shareholders’ best interests, vote against the proposals. If the combined effect is positive, support such proposals.

### 4b. Adjourn Meeting

Companies may ask shareholders to adjourn a meeting in order to solicit more votes. Generally, shareholders already have enough information to make their vote decisions. Once their votes have been cast, there is no justification for spending more money to continue pressing shareholders for more votes.

- **Boston Trust Walden Recommendation:**
- › Generally vote against proposals to provide management with the authority to adjourn an annual or special meeting absent compelling reasons to support the proposal.
  - › Vote for proposals that relate specifically to soliciting votes for a merger or transaction if supporting that merger or transaction. Vote against proposals if the wording is too vague or if the proposal includes “other business.”

### 4c. Changing Corporate Name

Proposals to change a company’s name are generally routine matters. Generally, the name change reflects a change in corporate direction or the result of a merger agreement.

- **Boston Trust Walden Recommendation:** Vote for changing the corporate name unless there is compelling evidence that the change would adversely affect shareholder value.

### 4d. Amend Quorum Requirements

- **Boston Trust Walden Recommendation:** Vote against proposals to reduce quorum requirements for shareholder meetings below a majority of the shares outstanding unless there are compelling reasons to support the proposal.

### 4e. Amend Minor Bylaws

- **Boston Trust Walden Recommendation:** Vote for bylaw or charter changes that are of a housekeeping nature (updates or corrections).

### 4f. Virtual Meetings

Companies are increasingly offering shareholders the option to virtually attend annual meetings and some are moving to virtual-only formats. Boston Trust Walden recognizes the benefits of virtual meetings, including convenience and accessibility, while also acknowledging their potential to limit some investors’ ability to raise issues of concern. Boston Trust Walden support leading practices for holding virtual meetings.

- **Boston Trust Walden Recommendation:**
- › Generally vote for management proposals allowing for the convening of shareholder meetings by electronic means, so long as they do not preclude in-person meetings or hinder shareholder access in any way.

- › Vote case-by-case on shareholder proposals concerning virtual-only meetings, considering the scope and rationale of the proposal as well as any concerns identified with the company's prior meeting practices.

#### **4g. Other Business**

Other business proposals are routine items to allow shareholders to raise other issues and discuss them at the meeting. Only issues that may be legally discussed at meetings may be raised under this authority. However, shareholders cannot know the content of these issues so they are generally not supported.




**Boston Trust Walden Recommendation:** Generally vote against other business proposals.

## 5. CAPITAL STRUCTURE

The equity in a corporate enterprise (that is, the residual value of the company's assets after the payment of all debts) belongs to the shareholders. Equity securities may be employed, or manipulated, in a manner that will ultimately enhance or detract from shareholder value. As such, certain actions undertaken by management in relation to a company's capital structure can be of considerable significance to shareholders. Changes in capitalization usually require shareholder approval or ratification.

### 5a. Common Stock Authorization

State statutes and stock exchanges require shareholder approval for increases in the number of common shares. Corporations increase their supply of common stock for a variety of ordinary business purposes: raising new capital, funding stock compensation programs, business acquisitions, and implementation of stock splits or payment of stock dividends.

 **Boston Trust Walden Recommendation:** Proposals to increase authorized common stock are evaluated on a case-by-case basis, taking into account the size of the increase, the company's rationale for additional shares, the company's use of authorized shares during the last three years, and the risk to shareholders if the request is not approved. A company's need for additional shares is gauged by measuring shares outstanding and reserved as a percentage of the total number of shares currently authorized for issuance.

If, within the past three years, the board adopted a poison pill without shareholder approval, repriced or exchanged underwater stock options without shareholder approval, or placed a substantial amount of stock with insiders at prices substantially below market value without shareholder approval, Boston Trust Walden will generally vote against the requested increase in authorized capital on the basis of imprudent past use of shares.

- › Vote for proposals to increase the number of authorized common shares where the primary purpose of the increase is to issue shares in connection with a transaction on the same ballot that warrants support.
- › Vote against proposals at companies with more than one class of common stock to increase the number of authorized shares of the class of common stock that has superior voting rights.
- › Vote against proposals to increase the number of authorized common shares if a vote for a reverse stock split on the same ballot is warranted despite the fact that the authorized shares would not be reduced proportionally.
- › Review on a case-by-case basis all other proposals to increase the number of shares of common stock authorized for issue, considering company-specific factors that include:
  - › Past Board Performance;
    - › The company's use of authorized shares during the last three years.
  - › The Current Request;
    - › Disclosure in the proxy statement of the specific purposes of the proposed increase;
    - › Disclosure in the proxy statement of specific and severe risks to shareholders of not approving the request; and
    - › The dilutive impact of the request as determined relative to an allowable increase calculated by Boston Trust Walden (typically 100 percent of existing authorized shares) that reflects the company's need for shares and total shareholder returns.

Boston Trust Walden will apply the relevant allowable increase below to requests to increase common stock that are for general corporate purposes (or to the general corporate purposes portion of a request that also includes a specific need):

- A. Most companies: **100 percent** of existing authorized shares.
- B. Companies with less than 50 percent of existing authorized shares either outstanding or reserved for issuance: **50 percent** of existing authorized shares.
- C. Companies with one- and three-year total shareholder returns (TSRs) in the bottom 10 percent of the U.S. market as of the end of the calendar quarter that is closest to their most recent fiscal year end: **50 percent** of existing authorized shares.
- D. Companies at which both conditions (B and C) above are both present: **25 percent** of existing authorized shares.

If there is an acquisition, private placement, or similar transaction on the ballot (not including equity incentive plans) that Boston Trust Walden is recommending FOR, the allowable increase will be the greater of (i) twice the amount needed to support the transactions on the ballot, and (ii) the allowable increase as calculated above.

### 5b. Issue Stock for Use with Rights Plan

- ▶ **Boston Trust Walden Recommendation:** Vote against proposals that increase authorized common stock for the explicit purpose of implementing a non-shareholder approved shareholder rights plan (poison pill).

### 5c. Stock Distributions: Splits and Dividends

- ▶ **Boston Trust Walden Recommendation:** Generally vote for management proposals to increase the common share authorization for stock split or stock dividend, provided that the effective increase in authorized shares is equal to or is less than the allowable increase calculated in accordance with Boston Trust Walden's Common Stock Authorization policy.

### 5d. Reverse Stock Splits

Reverse splits exchange multiple shares for a lesser amount to increase share price. Increasing share price is sometimes necessary to restore a company's share price to a level that will allow it to be traded on the national stock exchanges. In addition, some brokerage houses have a policy of not monitoring or investing in very low priced shares. Reverse stock splits help maintain stock liquidity.

- ▶ **Boston Trust Walden Recommendation:**
  - › Vote for management proposals to implement a reverse stock split when the number of authorized shares will be proportionately reduced.
  - › Vote against proposals when there is not a proportionate reduction of authorized shares, unless:
    - › A stock exchange has provided notice to the company of a potential delisting; or
    - › The effective increase in authorized shares is equal to or less than the allowable increase calculated in accordance with Boston Trust Walden's Common Stock Authorization policy.

### 5e. Preferred Stock Authorization

Preferred stock is an equity security which has certain features similar to debt instruments, such as fixed dividend payments, seniority of claims to common stock, and in most cases no voting rights. The terms of blank check preferred stock give the board of directors the power to issue shares of preferred stock at their discretion—with voting rights, conversion, distribution and other rights to be determined by the board at time of issue. Blank check preferred stock can be used for sound corporate purposes, but could be used as a device to thwart hostile takeovers without shareholder approval.

 **Boston Trust Walden Recommendation:**

- › Vote for proposals to increase the number of authorized preferred shares where the primary purpose of the increase is to issue shares in connection with a transaction on the same ballot that warrants support.
- › Vote against proposals at companies with more than one class or series of preferred stock to increase the number of authorized shares of the class or series of preferred stock that has superior voting rights.
- › Vote on a case-by-case basis all other proposals to increase the number of shares of preferred stock authorized for issuance, considering company-specific factors that include:
  - › Past Board Performance;
    - › The company's use of authorized preferred shares during the last three years.
  - › The Current Request;
    - › Disclosure in the proxy statement of specific reasons for the proposed increase;
    - › Disclosure in the proxy statement of specific and severe risks to shareholders for not approving the request;
    - › In instances where the company has existing authorized preferred stock, the dilutive impact of the request as determined by an allowable cap generated by Boston Trust Walden's quantitative model (typically 100 percent of existing authorized shares) that reflects the company's need for shares and total shareholder returns;
  - › Whether the shares requested are blank check preferred shares that can be used for antitakeover purposes.

*Blank Check Preferred Stock* **Boston Trust Walden Recommendation:**

- › Vote against proposals that would authorize the creation of new classes of preferred stock with unspecified voting, conversion, dividend distribution, and other rights ("blank check" preferred stock).
- › Vote against proposals to increase the number of blank check preferred stock authorized for issuance when no shares have been issued or reserved for a specific purpose.
- › Vote for proposals to create "decawed" blank check preferred stock (stock that cannot be used as a takeover defense).
- › Vote for requests to require shareholder approval for blank check authorizations.

## 5f. Adjustments to Par Value of Common Stock

Stock that has a fixed per share value that is on its certificate is called par value stock. The purpose of par value stock is to establish the maximum responsibility of a stockholder in the event that a corporation becomes insolvent. Proposals to reduce par value come from certain state level requirements for regulated industries such as banks, and other legal requirements relating to the payment of dividends.

 **Boston Trust Walden Recommendation:**

- › Vote for management proposals to reduce the par value of common stock unless the action is being taken to facilitate an anti-takeover device or some other negative corporate governance action.
- › Vote for management proposals to eliminate par value.

## 5g. Unequal Voting Rights/Dual Class Structure

Incumbent managers use unequal voting rights with the voting rights of their common shares superior to other shareholders in order to concentrate their power and insulate themselves from the wishes of the majority of shareholders. Dual class exchange offers involve a transfer of voting rights from one group of shareholders to another group of shareholders typically through the payment of a preferential dividend. A dual class recapitalization also

establishes two classes of common stock with unequal voting rights, but initially involves an equal distribution of preferential and inferior voting shares to current shareholders.

► **Boston Trust Walden Recommendation:** Generally vote against proposals to create a new class of common stock unless:

- › The company discloses a compelling rationale for the dual-class capital structure, including: a) the company's auditor has concluded that there is substantial doubt about the company's ability to continue as a going concern; or b) the new class of shares will be transitory;
- › The new class is intended for financing purposes with minimal or no dilution to current shareholders in both the short term and long term;
- › The new class is not designed to preserve or increase the voting power of an insider or significant shareholder.

## 5h. Preemptive Rights

Preemptive rights permit shareholders to share proportionately in any new issues of stock of the same class. These rights guarantee existing shareholders the first opportunity to purchase shares of new issues of stock in the same class as their own and in the same proportion. The absence of these rights could cause stockholders' interest in a company to be reduced by the sale of additional shares without their knowledge and at prices unfavorable to them. Preemptive rights, however, can make it difficult for corporations to issue large blocks of stock for general corporate purposes. Both corporations and shareholders benefit when corporations are able to arrange issues without preemptive rights that do not result in a substantial transfer of control.

► **Boston Trust Walden Recommendation:** Generally vote against proposals eliminating preemptive rights, while supporting proposals to restore or create preemptive rights.

## 5i. Debt Restructurings

Proposals to increase common and/or preferred shares and to issue shares as part of a debt-restructuring plan will be analyzed considering the following issues:

- › *Dilution*—How much will the ownership interest of existing shareholders be reduced, and how extreme will dilution to any future earnings be?
- › *Change in Control*—Will the transaction result in a change in control/management at the company? Are board and committee seats guaranteed? Do standstill provisions and voting agreements exist? Is veto power over certain corporate actions in place?
- › *Financial Issues*— company's financial situation, degree of need for capital, use of proceeds, and effect of the financing on the company's cost of capital;
- › *Terms of the offer*—discount/premium in purchase price to investor including any fairness opinion, termination penalties and exit strategy;
- › *Conflict of interest*—arm's length transactions and managerial incentives;
- › *Management's efforts to pursue other alternatives.*

► **Boston Trust Walden Recommendation:**

- › Review on a case-by-case basis proposals regarding debt restructurings.
- › Vote for the debt restructuring if it is expected that the company will file for bankruptcy if the transaction is not approved.

## 5j. Share Repurchase Programs

- **Boston Trust Walden Recommendation:** Vote for management proposals to institute open-market share repurchase plans in which all shareholders may participate on equal terms.

## 5k. Conversion of Securities

- **Boston Trust Walden Recommendation:**
- › Vote case-by-case on proposals regarding conversion of securities, taking into account the dilution to existing shareholders, the conversion price relative to market value, financial issues, control issues, termination penalties, and conflicts of interest.
  - › Vote for the conversion if it is expected that the company will be subject to onerous penalties or will be forced to file for bankruptcy if the transaction is not approved.

## 5l. Recapitalization

- **Boston Trust Walden Recommendation:** Vote case-by-case on recapitalizations (reclassifications of securities), taking into account:
- › Whether the capital structure is simplified ;
  - › Liquidity is enhanced;
  - › Fairness of conversion terms;
  - › Impact on voting power and dividends;
  - › Reasons for the reclassification;
  - › Conflicts of interest;
  - › Other alternatives considered.

## 6. EXECUTIVE AND DIRECTOR COMPENSATION

The global financial crisis resulted in significant erosion of shareholder value and highlighted the need for greater assurance that executive compensation is principally performance-based, fair, reasonable, and not designed in a manner that would incentivize excessive risk-taking by managements. The financial crisis raised questions about the role of pay incentives in influencing executive behavior and motivating inappropriate or excessive risk-taking that could threaten a corporation's long-term viability.

Evolving disclosure requirements have opened a wider window into compensation practices and processes, giving shareholders more opportunity and responsibility to ensure that pay is designed to create and sustain value. Companies in the U.S. are now required to evaluate and discuss potential risks arising from misguided or misaligned compensation programs. The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act requires advisory shareholder votes on executive compensation (management "say on pay"), an advisory vote on the frequency of say on pay, as well as a shareholder advisory vote on golden parachute compensation. The advent of "say on pay" votes for shareholders in the U.S. has provided a new communication mechanism and impetus for constructive engagement between shareholders and managers/directors on pay issues.

Boston Trust Walden believes that executive pay programs should be fair, competitive, reasonable, and create appropriate incentives, and that pay for performance should be a central tenet in executive compensation philosophy. Most investors expect corporations to adhere to certain best practice pay considerations in designing and administering executive and director compensation programs, including:

- › Appropriate pay-for-performance alignment with emphasis on long-term shareholder value: executive pay practices must be designed to attract, retain, and appropriately motivate the key employees who drive shareholder value creation over the long term. Evaluating appropriate alignment of pay incentives with shareholder value creation includes taking into consideration, among other factors, the link between pay and performance, the mix between fixed and variable pay, equity-based plan costs, and performance goals - including goals tied to significant social and environmental considerations.
- › Avoiding arrangements that risk "pay for failure": this includes assessing the appropriateness of long or indefinite contracts, excessive severance packages, guaranteed compensation, and practices or policies that fail to adequately mitigate against or address significant environmental, social and governance failures.
- › Independent and effective compensation committees: oversight of executive pay programs by directors with appropriate skills, knowledge, experience, and a sound process for compensation decision-making (e.g., including access to independent expertise and advice when needed) should be promoted.
- › Clear and comprehensive compensation disclosures: shareholders expect companies to provide informative and timely disclosures that enable shareholders to evaluate executive pay practices fully and fairly.
- › Avoiding inappropriate pay to non-executive directors: compensation to outside directors should not compromise their independence and ability to make appropriate judgments in overseeing managers' pay and performance. At the market level, this may incorporate a variety of generally accepted best practices.

A non-exhaustive list of best pay practices includes:

- › Employment contracts: Companies should enter into employment contracts under limited circumstances for a short time period (e.g., new executive hires for a three-year contract) for limited executives. The contracts should not have automatic renewal feature and should have a specified termination date.
- › Severance agreements: Severance provisions should not be so appealing that it becomes an incentive for the executive to be terminated. Severance provisions should exclude excise tax gross-up. The severance formula should be reasonable and not overly generous to the executive (e.g., severance multiples of 1X, 2X, or 3X and use pro-rated target/average historical bonus and not maximum bonus). Failure to renew employment contract, termination under questionable events, or poor performance should not be considered as appropriate reasons for severance payments.

- › *Change-in-control payments:* Change-in-control payments should only be made when there is a significant change in company ownership structure, and when there is a loss of employment or substantial change in job duties associated with the change in company ownership structure (“double-triggered”). Change-in-control provisions should exclude excise tax gross-up and eliminate the acceleration of vesting of equity awards upon a change in control unless provided under a double-trigger scenario. Similarly, change in control provisions in equity plans should be double-triggered. A change in control event should not result in an acceleration of vesting of all unvested stock options or removal of vesting/performance requirements on restricted stock/performance shares, unless there is a loss of employment or substantial change in job duties.
- › *Supplemental executive retirement plans (SERPs):* SERPs should not include sweeteners that can increase the SERP value significantly or even exponentially, such as additional years of service credited for pension calculation, inclusion of variable pay (e.g. bonuses and equity awards) into the formula. Pension formula should not include extraordinary annual bonuses paid close to retirement years, and should be based on the average, not the maximum level of compensation earned.
- › *Deferred compensation:* Above-market returns or guaranteed minimum returns should not be applied on deferred compensation.
- › *Disclosure practices:* The Compensation Discussion & Analysis should be written in plain English, with as little “legalese” as possible and formatted using section headers, bulleted lists, tables, and charts where possible to ease reader comprehension. Ultimately, the document should provide detail and rationale regarding compensation, strategy, pay mix, goals/metrics, challenges, competition and pay for performance linkage, etc. in a narrative fashion.
- › *Responsible use of company stock:* Companies should adopt policies that prohibit executives from speculating in company’s stock or using company stock in hedging activities, such as “cashless” collars, forward sales, equity swaps or other similar arrangements. Such behavior undermines the ultimate alignment with long-term shareholders’ interests. In addition, the policy should prohibit or discourage the use of company stock as collateral for margin loans, to avoid any potential sudden stock sales (required upon margin calls), that could have a negative impact on the company's stock price.
- › *Long-term focus:* Executive compensation programs should be designed to support companies’ long-term strategic goals. A short-term focus on performance does not necessarily create sustainable shareholder value, since long-term goals may be sacrificed to achieve short-term expectations. Compensation programs embedding a long-term focus with respect to company goals better align with the long-term interests of shareholders. Granting stock options and restricted stock to executives that vest in five years do not necessarily provide a long-term focus, as executives can sell the company shares once they vest. However, requiring senior executives to hold company stock until they retire can encourage a long-term focus on company performance.

## 6a-1. Advisory Votes on Executive Compensation – Management Say-on-Pay Proposals

The Dodd-Frank Act mandates advisory votes on executive compensation (aka management “say on pay” or MSOP) for a proxy or consent or authorization for an annual or other meeting of the shareholders that includes required SEC compensation disclosures. This non-binding shareholder vote on compensation must be included in a proxy or consent or authorization at least once every three years.

In general, the management say on pay (MSOP) ballot item is the primary focus of voting on executive pay practices – dissatisfaction with compensation practices can be expressed by voting against the MSOP proposal rather than voting against or withhold from the compensation committee. However, if there is no MSOP on the ballot, then the negative vote will apply to members of the compensation committee. In addition, in egregious cases, or if the board fails to respond to concerns raised by a prior MSOP proposal, then Boston Trust Walden will recommend a vote against or withhold votes from compensation committee members (or, if the full board is deemed accountable, all directors). If the negative factors involve equity-based compensation, then a vote against an equity-based plan proposal presented for shareholder approval may be appropriate.

► **Boston Trust Walden Recommendation:** Evaluate executive pay and practices, as well as certain aspects of outside director compensation on a case-by-case basis.

- › Vote against management say on pay (MSOP) proposals if:
  - › There is a misalignment between CEO pay and company performance ([pay-for-performance](#));
  - › The company maintains [problematic pay practices](#);
  - › The board exhibits a significant level of [poor communication and responsiveness](#) to shareholders.
- › Vote against or withhold from the members of the Compensation Committee and potentially the full board if:
  - › There is no MSOP on the ballot, and an against vote on an MSOP is warranted due to pay-for-performance misalignment, problematic pay practices, or the lack of adequate responsiveness on compensation issues raised previously, or a combination thereof;
  - › The board fails to respond adequately to a previous MSOP proposal that received less than 70 percent support of votes cast;
  - › The company has recently practiced or approved problematic pay practices, including option repricing or option backdating; or
  - › The situation is egregious.
- › Vote against an equity plan on the ballot if:
  - › A pay for performance misalignment exists, and a significant portion of the CEO's misaligned pay is attributed to non-performance-based equity awards, taking into consideration:
    - › Magnitude of pay misalignment;
    - › Contribution of non-performance-based equity grants to overall pay; and
    - › The proportion of equity awards granted in the last three fiscal years concentrated at the named executive officer (NEO) level.

## 6a-2. Frequency of Advisory Vote on Executive Compensation – Management Say on Pay


The Dodd-Frank Act, in addition to requiring advisory votes on compensation (aka management "say on pay" or MSOP), requires that each proxy for the first annual or other meeting of the shareholders (that includes required SEC compensation disclosures) occurring after Jan. 21, 2011, include an advisory voting item to determine whether, going forward, the "say on pay" vote by shareholders to approve compensation should occur every one, two, or three years.

Boston Trust Walden will recommend a vote for annual advisory votes on compensation. The MSOP is at its essence a communication vehicle, and communication is most useful when it is received in a consistent and timely manner. Boston Trust Walden supports an annual MSOP vote for many of the same reasons it supports annual director elections rather than a classified board structure: because this provides the highest level of accountability and direct communication by enabling the MSOP vote to correspond to the majority of the information presented in the accompanying proxy statement for the applicable shareholders' meeting. Having MSOP votes every two or three years, covering all actions occurring between the votes, would make it difficult to create the meaningful and coherent communication that the votes are intended to provide. Under triennial elections, for example, a company would not know whether the shareholder vote references the compensation year being discussed or a previous year, making it more difficult to understand the implications of the vote.

► **Boston Trust Walden Recommendation:** Vote for annual advisory votes on compensation, which provide the most consistent and clear communication channel for shareholder concerns about companies' executive pay programs.

### 6a-3. Advisory Vote on Golden Parachutes in an Acquisition, Merger, Consolidation, or Proposed Sale

This is a proxy item regarding specific advisory votes on "golden parachute" arrangements for Named Executive Officers (NEOs) that is required under The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act. Boston Trust Walden places particular focus on severance packages that provide inappropriate windfalls and cover certain tax liabilities of executives.

 **Boston Trust Walden Recommendation:** Vote case-by-case on say on Golden Parachute proposals, including consideration of existing change-in-control arrangements maintained with named executive officers rather than focusing primarily on new or extended arrangements.

Features that may result in an against recommendation include one or more of the following, depending on the number, magnitude, and/or timing of issue(s):

- › Single- or modified-single-trigger cash severance;
- › Single-trigger acceleration of unvested equity awards;
- › Excessive cash severance (>3x base salary and bonus);
- › Excise tax gross-ups triggered and payable (as opposed to a provision to provide excise tax gross-ups);
- › Excessive golden parachute payments (on an absolute basis or as a percentage of transaction equity value); or
- › Recent amendments that incorporate any problematic features (such as those above) or recent actions (such as extraordinary equity grants) that may make packages so attractive as to influence merger agreements that may not be in the best interests of shareholders; or
- › The company's assertion that a proposed transaction is conditioned on shareholder approval of the golden parachute advisory vote.

Recent amendment(s) that incorporate problematic features will tend to carry more weight on the overall analysis. However, the presence of multiple legacy problematic features will also be closely scrutinized.

In cases where the golden parachute vote is incorporated into a company's advisory vote on compensation ("management "say on pay"), Boston Trust Walden will evaluate the "say on pay" proposal in accordance with these guidelines, which may give higher weight to that component of the overall evaluation.

### 6a-4. Equity-Based Incentive Plans


As executive pay levels continue to soar, non-salary compensation remains one of the most sensitive and visible corporate governance issues. The financial crisis raised questions about the role of pay incentives in influencing executive behavior, including their appetite for risk-taking. Although shareholders may have little say about how much the CEO is paid in salary and bonus, they do have a major voice in approving stock incentive plans.

Stock-based plans can transfer significant amounts of wealth from shareholders to executives and directors and are among the most economically significant issues that shareholders are entitled to vote on. Rightly, the cost of these plans must be in line with the anticipated benefits to shareholders. Clearly, reasonable limits must be set on dilution as well as administrative authority. In addition, shareholders must consider the necessity of the various pay programs and examine the appropriateness of award types. Consequently, the pros and cons of these proposals necessitate a case-by-case evaluation.

Factors that increase the cost (or have the potential to increase the cost) of plans to shareholders include: excessive dilution, options awarded at below-market discounts, permissive policies on pyramiding, restricted stock giveaways that reward tenure rather than results, sales of shares on concessionary terms, blank-check authority for administering committees, option repricing or option replacements, accelerated vesting of awards in the event of defined changes in

corporate control, stand-alone stock appreciation rights, loans or other forms of assistance, or evidence of improvident award policies.

Positive plan features that can offset costly features include: plans with modest dilution potential (i.e. appreciably below double-digit levels), bars to pyramiding and related safeguards for investor interests. Also favorable are performance programs with a duration of two or more years, bonus schemes that pay off in non-dilutive, fully deductible cash, 401K and other thrift or profit sharing plans, and tax-favored employee stock purchase plans. In general, we believe that stock plans should afford incentives, not sure-fire, risk-free rewards.

 **Boston Trust Walden Recommendation:** Vote case-by-case on equity-based compensation plans<sup>5</sup> depending on a combination of certain plan features and equity grant practices, where positive factors may counterbalance negative factors, and vice versa, as evaluated using an "equity plan scorecard" (EPSC) approach with three pillars:

- › **Plan Cost:** The total estimated cost of the company's equity plans relative to industry/market cap peers, measured by the company's estimated Shareholder Value Transfer (SVT) in relation to peers and considering both:
  - › SVT based on new shares requested plus shares remaining for future grants, plus outstanding unvested/unexercised grants; and
  - › SVT based only on new shares requested plus shares remaining for future grants.
- › **Plan Features:**
  - › Automatic single-triggered award vesting upon a change in control (CIC);
  - › Discretionary vesting authority;
  - › Liberal share recycling on various award types;
  - › Lack of minimum vesting period for grants made under the plan;
  - › Dividends payable prior to award vesting.
- › **Grant Practices:**
  - › The company's three-year burn rate relative to its industry/market cap peers;
  - › Vesting requirements in most recent CEO equity grants (3-year look-back);
  - › The estimated duration of the plan (based on the sum of shares remaining available and the new shares requested, divided by the average annual shares granted in the prior three years);
  - › The proportion of the CEO's most recent equity grants/awards subject to performance conditions;
  - › Whether the company maintains a claw-back policy;
  - › Whether the company has established post exercise/vesting share-holding requirements.

Generally vote against the plan proposal if the combination of above factors indicates that the plan is not, overall, in shareholders' interests, or if any of the following apply:

- › Awards may vest in connection with a liberal change-of-control definition;
- › The plan would permit repricing or cash buyout of underwater options without shareholder approval (either by expressly permitting it – for NYSE and Nasdaq listed companies -- or by not prohibiting it when the company has a history of repricing – for non-listed companies);
- › The plan is a vehicle for problematic pay practices or a pay-for-performance disconnect; or
- › Any other plan features are determined to have a significant negative impact on shareholder interests.

Each of these factors is described below.

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<sup>5</sup> Proposals evaluated under the EPSC policy generally include those to approve or amend (1) stock option plans for employees and/or employees and directors, (2) restricted stock plans for employees and/or employees and directors, and (3) omnibus stock incentive plans for employees and/or employees and directors.

**6a-4(a). Plan Cost**

Generally vote against equity plans if the cost is unreasonable. For non-employee director plans, vote for the plan if certain factors are met.

**Shareholder Value Transfer (SVT)**

The cost of the equity plans is expressed as Shareholder Value Transfer (SVT), which is measured using a binomial option pricing model that assesses the amount of shareholders' equity flowing out of the company to employees and directors. SVT is expressed as both a dollar amount and as a percentage of market value, and includes the new shares proposed, shares available under existing plans, and shares granted but unexercised (using two measures, in the case of plans subject to the Equity Plan Scorecard evaluation, as noted above). All award types are valued. For omnibus plans, unless limitations are placed on the most expensive types of awards (for example, full value awards), the assumption is made that all awards to be granted will be the most expensive types. See discussion of specific types of awards.

Except for proposals subject to Equity Plan Scorecard evaluation, Shareholder Value Transfer is reasonable if it falls below a company-specific benchmark. The benchmark is determined as follows: The top quartile performers in each industry group (using the Global Industry Classification Standard: GICS) are identified. Benchmark SVT levels for each industry are established based on these top performers' historic SVT. Regression analyses are run on each industry group to identify the variables most strongly correlated to SVT. The benchmark industry SVT level is then adjusted upwards or downwards for the specific company by plugging the company-specific performance measures, size and cash compensation into the industry cap equations to arrive at the company's benchmark.<sup>6</sup>

**6a-4(b). Repricing Provisions**

Vote against plans that expressly permit the repricing or exchange of underwater stock options/stock appreciate rights (SARs) without prior shareholder approval. "Repricing" includes the ability to do any of the following:

- › Amend the terms of outstanding options or SARs to reduce the exercise price of such outstanding options or SARs;
- › Cancel outstanding options or SARs in exchange for options or SARs with an exercise price that is less than the exercise price of the original options or SARs.

Also, vote against or withhold from members of the Compensation Committee who approved and/or implemented a repricing or an option/SAR exchange program, by buying out underwater options/SARs for stock, cash or other consideration or canceling underwater options/SARs and regranting options/SARs with a lower exercise price, without prior shareholder approval, even if such repricings are allowed in their equity plan.

Vote against plans if the company has a history of repricing without shareholder approval, and the applicable listing standards would not preclude them from doing so.

**6a-4(c). Pay-for-Performance Misalignment – Application to Equity Plans**

If the equity plan on the ballot is a vehicle for [problematic pay practices](#), vote against the plan.

If a significant portion of the CEO's misaligned pay is attributed to non-performance-based equity awards, and there is an equity plan on the ballot with the CEO as one of the participants, Boston Trust Walden may recommend a vote against the equity plan. Considerations in voting against the equity plan may include, but are not limited to:

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<sup>6</sup> For plans evaluated under the Equity Plan Scorecard policy, the company's SVT benchmark is considered along with other factors.

- › Magnitude of pay misalignment;
- › Contribution of non-performance-based equity grants to overall pay; and
- › The proportion of equity awards granted in the last three fiscal years concentrated at the named executive officer level.

#### 6a-4(d). Grant Practices

##### Three-Year Burn Rate

Burn rate benchmarks (utilized in Equity Plan Scorecard evaluations) are calculated as the greater of: (1) the mean ( $\mu$ ) plus one standard deviation ( $\sigma$ ) of the company's GICS group segmented by S&P 500, Russell 3000 index (less the S&P500) and non-Russell 3000 index; and (2) two percent of weighted common shares outstanding. In addition, year-over-year burn-rate benchmark changes will be limited to a maximum of two (2) percentage points plus or minus the prior year's burn-rate benchmark.


#### 6a-4(e). Liberal Definition of Change-in-Control

Generally vote against equity plans if the plan provides for the acceleration of vesting of equity awards even though an actual change in control may not occur. Examples of such a definition could include, but are not limited to, announcement or commencement of a tender offer, provisions for acceleration upon a "potential" takeover, shareholder approval of a merger or other transactions, or similar language.

## 6b. Other Compensation Plans

### 6b-1. Amending Cash and Equity Plans (including Approval for Tax Deductibility (162(m)))

Cash bonus plans can be an important part of an executive's overall pay package, along with stock-based plans tied to long-term total shareholder returns. Over the long term, stock prices are an excellent indicator of management performance. However, other factors, such as economic conditions and investor reaction to the stock market in general and certain industries in particular, can greatly impact the company's stock price. As a result, a cash bonus plan can effectively reward individual performance and the achievement of business unit objectives that are independent of short-term market share price fluctuations.

 **Boston Trust Walden Recommendation:** Vote case-by-case on amendments to cash and equity incentive plans.

Generally vote for proposals to amend executive cash, stock, or cash and stock incentive plans if the proposal:

- › Addresses administrative features only; or
- › Seeks approval for Section 162(m) purposes only, and the plan administering committee consists entirely of independent outsiders, per Boston Trust Walden's Categorization of Directors. Note that if the company is presenting the plan to shareholders for the first time after the company's initial public offering (IPO), or if the proposal is bundled with other material plan amendments, then the recommendation will be case-by-case (see below).

Vote against such proposals to amend executive cash, stock, or cash and stock incentive plans if the proposal:

- › Seeks approval for Section 162(m) purposes only, and the plan administering committee does not consist entirely of independent outsiders, per Boston Trust Walden's Categorization of Directors.

Vote case-by-case on all other proposals to amend cash incentive plans. This includes plans presented to shareholders for the first time after the company's IPO and/or proposals that bundle material amendment(s) other than those for Section 162(m) purposes

Vote case-by-case on all other proposals to amend equity incentive plans, considering the following:


- › If the proposal requests additional shares and/or the amendments may potentially increase the transfer of shareholder value to employees, the recommendation will be based on the Equity Plan Scorecard evaluation as well as an analysis of the overall impact of the amendments.
- › If the plan is being presented to shareholders for the first time after the company's IPO, whether or not additional shares are being requested, the recommendation will be based on the Equity Plan Scorecard evaluation as well as an analysis of the overall impact of any amendments.
- › If there is no request for additional shares and the amendments are not deemed to potentially increase the transfer of shareholder value to employees, then the recommendation will be based entirely on an analysis of the overall impact of the amendments, and the EPSC evaluation will be shown for informational purposes.

## 6b-2. Employee Stock Purchase Plans (ESPPs)

Employee stock purchase plans enable employees to become shareholders, which gives them a stake in the company's growth. However, purchase plans are beneficial only when they are well balanced and in the best interests of all shareholders. From a shareholder's perspective, plans with offering periods of 27 months or less are preferable. Plans with longer offering periods remove too much of the market risk and could give participants excessive discounts on their stock purchases that are not offered to other shareholders.

### 6b-2(a). Qualified Plans

Qualified employee stock purchase plans qualify for favorable tax treatment under Section 423 of the Internal Revenue Code. Such plans must be broad-based, permitting all full-time employees to participate. Some companies also permit part-time staff to participate. Qualified ESPPs must be expensed under SFAS 123 unless the plan meets the following conditions; a) purchase discount is 5 percent or below; b) all employees can participate in the program; and 3) no look-back feature in the program.. Therefore, some companies offer nonqualified ESPPs.

 **Boston Trust Walden Recommendation:** Vote case-by-case on qualified employee stock purchase plans. Vote for employee stock purchase plans where all of the following apply:

- › Purchase price is at least 85 percent of fair market value;
- › Offering period is 27 months or less; and
- › The number of shares allocated to the plan is ten percent or less of the outstanding shares.


Vote against qualified employee stock purchase plans where any of the following apply:

- › Purchase price is less than 85 percent of fair market value; or
- › Offering period is greater than 27 months; or
- › The number of shares allocated to the plan is more than ten percent of the outstanding shares.

### 6b-2(b). Non-Qualified Plans

For nonqualified ESPPs, companies provide a match to employees' contributions instead of a discount in stock price. Also, limits are placed on employees' contributions. Some companies provide a maximum dollar value for the year and others specify the limits in terms of a percent of base salary, excluding bonus or commissions. For plans that do not

qualify under Section 423 of the Internal Revenue Code, a plan participant will not recognize income by participating in the plan, but will recognize ordinary compensation income for federal income tax purposes at the time of the purchase.

 **Boston Trust Walden Recommendation:** Vote case-by-case on nonqualified employee stock purchase plans. Vote for nonqualified employee stock purchase plans with all the following features:

- › Broad-based participation (i.e., all employees of the company with the exclusion of individuals with 5 percent or more of beneficial ownership of the company);
- › Limits on employee contribution, which may be a fixed dollar amount or expressed as a percent of base salary;
- › Company matching contribution up to 25 percent of employee's contribution, which is effectively a discount of 20 percent from market value;
- › No discount on the stock price on the date of purchase since there is a company matching contribution.


Vote against nonqualified employee stock purchase plans when any of the plan features do not meet the above criteria. If the company matching contribution exceeds 25 percent of employee's contribution, evaluate the cost of the plan against its allowable cap.

### 6b-3. Employee Stock Ownership Plans (ESOPs)


An Employee Stock Ownership Plan (ESOP) is an employee benefit plan that makes the employees of a company also owners of stock in that company. The plans are designed to defer a portion of current employee income for retirement purposes.

The primary difference between ESOPs and other employee benefit plans is that ESOPs invest primarily in the securities of the employee's company. In addition, an ESOP must be created for the benefit of non-management level employees and administered by a trust that cannot discriminate in favor of highly paid personnel.

Academic research of the performance of ESOPs in closely held companies found that ESOPs appear to increase overall sales, employment, and sales per employee over what would have been expected absent an ESOP. Studies have also found that companies with an ESOP are also more likely to still be in business several years later, and are more likely to have other retirement oriented benefit plans than comparable non-ESOP companies.

 **Boston Trust Walden Recommendation:** Vote for proposals to implement an ESOP or increase authorized shares for existing ESOPs, unless the number of shares allocated to the ESOP is excessive (more than five percent of outstanding shares).

### 6b-4. Option Exchange Programs/Repricing Options

 **Boston Trust Walden Recommendation:** Vote case-by-case on management proposals seeking approval to exchange/reprice options taking into consideration:

- › Historic trading patterns — the stock price should not be so volatile that the options are likely to be back “in-the-money” over the near term;
- › Rationale for the re-pricing — was the stock price decline beyond management's control?
- › Is this a value-for-value exchange?
- › Are surrendered stock options added back to the plan reserve?
- › Option vesting — does the new option vest immediately or is there a black-out period?
- › Term of the option — the term should remain the same as that of the replaced option;
- › Exercise price — should be set at fair market or a premium to market;
- › Participants — executive officers and directors should be excluded.

If the surrendered options are added back to the equity plans for re-issuance, then also take into consideration the company's total cost of equity plans and its three-year average burn rate.

In addition to the above considerations, evaluate the intent, rationale, and timing of the repricing proposal. The proposal should clearly articulate why the board is choosing to conduct an exchange program at this point in time. Repricing underwater options after a recent precipitous drop in the company's stock price demonstrates poor timing. Repricing after a recent decline in stock price triggers additional scrutiny and a potential vote against the proposal. At a minimum, the decline should not have happened within the past year. Also, consider the terms of the surrendered options, such as the grant date, exercise price and vesting schedule. Grant dates of surrendered options should be far enough back (two to three years) so as not to suggest that repricings are being done to take advantage of short-term downward price movements. Similarly, the exercise price of surrendered options should be above the 52-week high for the stock price.

### 6b-5. Stock Plans in Lieu of Cash



#### **Boston Trust Walden Recommendation:**

- › Vote case-by-case on plans that provide participants with the option of taking all or a portion of their cash compensation in the form of stock.
- › Vote for non-employee director-only equity plans that provide a dollar-for-dollar cash-for-stock exchange.
- › Vote case-by-case on plans which do not provide a dollar-for-dollar cash for stock exchange. In cases where the exchange is not dollar-for-dollar, the request for new or additional shares for such equity program will be considered using the binomial option pricing model. In an effort to capture the total cost of total compensation, Boston Trust Walden will not make any adjustments to carve out the in-lieu-of cash compensation.

### 6b-6. Transfer Stock Option (TSO) Programs



**Boston Trust Walden Recommendation:** **One-time Transfers:** Vote against or withhold from compensation committee members if they fail to submit one-time transfers to shareholders for approval.

Vote case-by-case on one-time transfers. Vote for if:

- › Executive officers and non-employee directors are excluded from participating;
- › Stock options are purchased by third-party financial institutions at a discount to their fair value using option pricing models such as Black-Scholes or a Binomial Option Valuation or other appropriate financial models;
- › There is a two-year minimum holding period for sale proceeds (cash or stock) for all participants.

Additionally, management should provide a clear explanation of why options are being transferred to a third-party institution and whether the events leading up to a decline in stock price were beyond management's control. A review of the company's historic stock price volatility should indicate if the options are likely to be back "in-the-money" over the near term.

**Ongoing TSO program:** Vote against equity plan proposals if the details of ongoing TSO programs are not provided to shareholders. Since TSOs will be one of the award types under a stock plan, the ongoing TSO program, structure and mechanics must be disclosed to shareholders. The specific criteria to be considered in evaluating these proposals include, but not limited to, the following: 1) Eligibility; 2) Vesting; 3) Bid-price; 4) Term of options; 5) Cost of the program and impact of the TSOs on company's total option expense; 6) Option repricing policy.

Amendments to existing plans that allow for introduction of transferability of stock options should make clear that only options granted post-amendment shall be transferable.

## 6b-7. Severance Agreements for Executives/Golden Parachutes



**Boston Trust Walden Recommendation:** Vote on a case-by-case basis on proposals to ratify or cancel golden parachutes. An acceptable parachute should include, but is not limited to, the following:

- › The triggering mechanism should be beyond the control of management;
- › The amount should not exceed three times base amount (defined as the average annual taxable W-2 compensation during the five years prior to the year in which the change of control occurs;
- › Change-in-control payments should be double-triggered, i.e., (1) after a change in control has taken place, and (2) termination of the executive as a result of the change in control. Change in control is defined as a change in the company ownership structure.

## 6c. Director Compensation

The board's legal charge of fulfilling its fiduciary obligations of loyalty and care is put to the ultimate test through the task of the board setting its own compensation. Directors themselves oversee the process for evaluating board performance and establishing pay packages for board members.


Shareholders provide limited oversight of directors by electing individuals who are primarily selected by the board, or a board nominating committee, and by voting on stock-based plans for directors designed by the board compensation committee. Additionally, shareholders may submit and vote on their own resolutions seeking to limit or restructure director pay. While the cost of compensating non-employee directors is small in absolute terms, compared to the cost of compensating executives, it is still a critical aspect of a company's overall corporate governance structure.

Overall, director pay levels are rising in part because of the new forms of pay in use at many companies, as well as because of the increased responsibilities arising from the 2002 Sarbanes-Oxley Act requirements. In addition to an annual retainer fee, many companies also pay fees for attending board and committee meetings, fees for chairing a committee, or a retainer fee for chairing a committee.

Director compensation packages should be designed to provide value to directors for their contribution. Given that many directors are high-level executives whose personal income levels are generally high, cash compensation may hold little appeal. Stock-based incentives on the other hand reinforce the directors' role of protecting and enhancing shareholder value. The stock-based component of director compensation should be large enough to ensure that when faced with a situation in which the interests of shareholders and management differ, the board will have a financial incentive to think as a shareholder. Additionally, many companies have instituted equity ownership programs for directors. Boston Trust Walden recommends that directors receive stock grants equal to three times of their annual retainer, as it is a reasonable starting point for companies of all sizes and industries. A vesting schedule for director grants helps directors to meet the stock ownership guidelines and maintains their long-term interests in the firm.


Director compensation packages should also be designed to attract and retain competent directors who are willing to risk becoming a defendant in a lawsuit and suffer potentially adverse publicity if the company runs into financial difficulties or is mismanaged.

### 6c-1. Shareholder Ratification of Director Pay Programs

-  **Boston Trust Walden Recommendation:** Vote case-by-case on management proposals seeking ratification of non-employee director compensation, based on the following factors:
- › If the equity plan under which non-employee director grants are made is on the ballot, whether or not it warrants support; and
  - › An assessment of the following qualitative factors:
    - › The relative magnitude of director compensation as compared to companies of a similar profile;
    - › The presence of problematic pay practices relating to director compensation;
    - › Director stock ownership guidelines and holding requirements;
    - › Equity award vesting schedules;
    - › The mix of cash and equity-based compensation;
    - › Meaningful limits on director compensation;
    - › The availability of retirement benefits or perquisites; and
    - › The quality of disclosure surrounding director compensation.

### 6c-2. Equity Plans for Non-Employee Directors

Stock-based plans may take on a variety of forms including: grants of stock or options, including: discretionary grants, formula based grants, and one-time awards; stock-based awards in lieu of all or some portion of the cash retainer and/or other fees; and deferred stock plans allowing payment of retainer and/or meeting fees to be taken in stock, the payment of which is postponed to some future time, typically retirement or termination of directorship.

-  **Boston Trust Walden Recommendation:** Vote case-by-case on compensation plans for non-employee directors, based on:
- › The total estimated cost of the company's equity plans relative to industry/market cap peers, measured by the company's estimated Shareholder Value Transfer (SVT) based on new shares requested plus shares remaining for future grants, plus outstanding unvested/unexercised grants;
  - › The company's three year burn rate relative to its industry/market cap peers; and
  - › The presence of any egregious plan features (such as an option repricing provision or liberal CIC vesting risk).

On occasion, director stock plans that set aside a relatively small number of shares will exceed the plan cost or burn rate benchmark when combined with employee or executive stock compensation plans. In such cases, vote for the plan if all of the following qualitative factors in the board's compensation are met and disclosed in the proxy statement:

- › The relative magnitude of director compensation as compared to companies of a similar profile;
- › The presence of problematic pay practices relating to director compensation;
- › Director stock ownership guidelines and holding requirement;
- › Equity award vesting schedules ;
- › The mix of cash and equity-based compensation ;
- › Meaningful limits on director compensation;
- › The availability of retirement benefits or perquisites ;
- › The quality of disclosure surrounding director compensation .

### 6c-3. Outside Director Stock Awards/Options in Lieu of Cash

These proposals seek to pay outside directors a portion of their compensation in stock rather than cash. By doing this, a director's interest may be more closely aligned with those of shareholders.

- ▶ **Boston Trust Walden Recommendation:** Vote for proposals that seek to pay outside directors a portion of their compensation in stock rather than cash.

#### 6c-4. Director Retirement Plans

- ▶ **Boston Trust Walden Recommendation:**
- › Vote against retirement plans for non-employee directors.
  - › Vote for shareholder proposals to eliminate retirement plans for non-employee directors.

### 6d. Shareholder Proposals on Compensation

#### 6d-1. Increase Disclosure of Executive Compensation

The SEC requires that companies disclose, in their proxy statements, the salaries of the top five corporate executives (who make at least \$100,000 a year). Companies also disclose their compensation practices and details of their stock-based compensation plans. While this level of disclosure is helpful, it does not always provide a comprehensive picture of the company's compensation practices. For shareholders to make informed decisions on compensation levels, they need to have clear, concise information at their disposal. Increased disclosure will help ensure that management: (1) has legitimate reasons for setting specific pay levels; and (2) is held accountable for its actions.

- ▶ **Boston Trust Walden Recommendation:** Vote for shareholder proposals seeking increased disclosure on executive compensation issues including the preparation of a formal report on executive compensation practices and policies.

#### 6d-2. Limit Executive Compensation

Proposals that seek to limit executive or director compensation usually focus on the absolute dollar figure of the compensation or focus on the ratio of compensation between the executives and the average worker of a specific company. Proponents argue that the exponential growth of executive salaries is not in the best interests of shareholders, especially when that pay is exorbitant when compared to the compensation of other workers.

- ▶ **Boston Trust Walden Recommendation:**
- › Vote case-by-case on proposals to prepare reports seeking to compare the wages of a company's lowest paid worker to the highest paid workers.
  - › Generally vote against proposals that seek to establish a fixed ratio between the company's lowest paid workers and the highest paid workers.

#### 6d-3. Severance Agreements/Golden Parachutes

Golden parachutes are designed to protect the employees of a corporation in the event of a change in control. With Golden Parachutes senior level management employees receive a payout during a change in control at usually two to three times base salary.

- ▶ **Boston Trust Walden Recommendation:** Vote for shareholder proposals requiring that golden parachutes or executive severance agreements be submitted for shareholder ratification, unless the proposal requires shareholder approval prior to entering into employment contracts.

#### 6d-4. Performance-Based Equity Awards

Boston Trust Walden supports compensating executives at a reasonable rate and believes that executive compensation should be strongly correlated to performance. Boston Trust Walden supports equity awards that provide challenging performance objectives and serve to motivate executives to superior performance and as performance-contingent stock options as a significant component of compensation.

► **Boston Trust Walden Recommendation:** Vote case-by-case on shareholder proposal requesting that a significant amount of future long-term incentive compensation awarded to senior executives shall be performance-based and requesting that the board adopt and disclose challenging performance metrics to shareholders, based on the following analytical steps:

- › First, vote for shareholder proposals advocating the use of performance-based equity awards, such as performance contingent options or restricted stock, indexed options or premium-priced options, unless the proposal is overly restrictive or if the company has demonstrated that it is using a “substantial” portion of performance-based awards for its top executives. Standard stock options and performance-accelerated awards do not meet the criteria to be considered as performance-based awards. Further, premium-priced options should have a premium of at least 25 percent and higher to be considered performance-based awards.
- › Second, assess the rigor of the company’s performance-based equity program. If the bar set for the performance-based program is too low based on the company’s historical or peer group comparison, generally vote for the proposal. Furthermore, if target performance results in an above target payout, vote for the shareholder proposal due to program’s poor design. If the company does not disclose the performance metric of the performance-based equity program, vote for the shareholder proposal regardless of the outcome of the first step to the test.

In general, vote for the shareholder proposal if the company does not meet both of the above two steps.

#### 6d-5. Link Compensation to Non-Financial Factors

Proponents of these proposals feel that social and environmental criteria should be factored into the formulas used in determining executive compensation packages. The shareholder sponsors of the resolutions look to companies to review current compensation practices and to include significant social or environmental performance criteria and meeting environmental or workplace safety objectives and metrics when evaluating executive compensation. Some of the non-financial criteria that proponents of these resolutions seek to be incorporated in compensation program design include workplace safety, environmental stewardship, or diversity and customer/employee satisfaction – as part of a written policy used to align compensation with performance on non-financial factors alongside financial criteria.

Proponents believe that factors such as poor environmental performance, workplace lawsuits, etc. could have a significant adverse impact on a company’s financial performance if not proactively and adequately addressed, and that these factors should be considered along with traditional financial considerations when determining executive pay.

► **Boston Trust Walden Recommendation:** Vote case-by-case on shareholder proposals seeking reports on linking executive pay to non-financial factors including performance against social and environmental goals.

#### 6d-6. Advisory Vote on Executive Compensation (Say-on-Pay) Shareholder Proposals

► **Boston Trust Walden Recommendation:** Generally, vote for shareholder proposals that call for non-binding shareholder ratification of the compensation of the Named Executive Officers and the accompanying narrative disclosure of material factors provided to understand the Summary Compensation Table.

#### 6d-7. Termination of Employment Prior to Severance Payment and Eliminating Accelerated Vesting of Unvested Equity

- **Boston Trust Walden Recommendation:** Generally vote for proposals seeking a policy that prohibits acceleration of the vesting of equity awards to senior executives in the event of a change in control (except for pro rata vesting considering the time elapsed and attainment of any related performance goals between the award date and the change in control).

Vote on a case-by-case on shareholder proposals seeking a policy requiring termination of employment prior to severance payment, and eliminating accelerated vesting of unvested equity. The following factors will be taken into regarding this policy:

- › The company's current treatment of equity in change-of-control situations (i.e. is it double triggered, does it allow for the assumption of equity by acquiring company, the treatment of performance shares;
- › Current employment agreements, including potential problematic pay practices such as gross-ups embedded in those agreements.

### 6d-8. Tax Gross-up Proposals

- **Boston Trust Walden Recommendation:** Generally vote for proposals calling for companies to adopt a policy of not providing tax gross-up payments to executives, except in situations where gross-ups are provided pursuant to a plan, policy, or arrangement applicable to management employees of the company, such as a relocation or expatriate tax equalization policy.

### 6d-9. Compensation Consultants - Disclosure of Board or Company's Utilization

- **Boston Trust Walden Recommendation:** Generally vote for shareholder proposals seeking disclosure regarding the Company, Board, or Compensation Committee's use of compensation consultants, such as company name, business relationship(s) and fees paid.

### 6d-10. Golden Coffins/Executive Death Benefits

- **Boston Trust Walden Recommendation:** Generally vote for proposals calling companies to adopt a policy of obtaining shareholder approval for any future agreements and corporate policies that could oblige the company to make payments or awards following the death of a senior executive in the form of unearned salary or bonuses, accelerated vesting or the continuation in force of unvested equity grants, perquisites and other payments or awards made in lieu of compensation. This would not apply to any benefit programs or equity plan proposals that the broad-based employee population is eligible.

### 6d-11. Recoup Bonuses

- **Boston Trust Walden Recommendation:** Vote on a case-by-case on proposals to recoup unearned incentive bonuses or other incentive payments made to senior executives if it is later determined that the figures upon which incentive compensation is earned later turn out to have been in error. This is line with the clawback provision in the Troubled Asset Relief Program. Many companies have adopted policies that permit recoupment in cases where fraud, misconduct, or negligence significantly contributed to a restatement of financial results that led to the awarding of unearned incentive compensation. The following will be taken into consideration:

- › If the company has adopted a formal recoupment bonus policy;
- › If the company has chronic restatement history or material financial problems;
- › If the company's policy substantially addresses the concerns raised by the proponent.

### 6d-12. Bonus Banking

- **Boston Trust Walden Recommendation:** Vote case-by-case on proposals seeking deferral of a portion of annual bonus pay, with ultimate payout linked to sustained results for the performance metrics on which the bonus was earned (whether for the named executive officers or a wider group of employees), taking into account the following factors:
- › The company's past practices regarding equity and cash compensation;
  - › Whether the company has a holding period or stock ownership requirements in place, such as a meaningful retention ratio (at least 50 percent for full tenure); and
  - › Whether the company has a rigorous claw-back policy in place.

### 6d-13. Non-Deductible Compensation

- **Boston Trust Walden Recommendation:** Generally vote for proposals seeking disclosure of the extent to which the company paid non-deductible compensation to senior executives due to Internal Revenue Code Section 162(m), while considering the company's existing disclosure practices.

### 6d-14. Proxy Voting Tabulation

- **Boston Trust Walden Recommendation:** Vote case-by-case on proposals regarding proxy voting mechanics, taking into consideration whether implementation of the proposal is likely to enhance or protect shareholder rights. Specific issues covered under the policy include, but are not limited to, confidential voting of individual proxies and ballots, confidentiality of running vote tallies, and the treatment of abstentions and/or broker non-votes in the company's vote-counting methodology.

Vote for proposals asking to provide vote counting to exclude abstentions.

## 7. MERGERS AND CORPORATE RESTRUCTURINGS

A merger occurs when one corporation is absorbed into another and ceases to exist. The surviving company gains all the rights, privileges, powers, duties, obligations and liabilities of the merged corporation. The shareholders of the absorbed company receive stock or securities of the surviving company or other consideration as provided by the plan of merger. Mergers, consolidations, share exchanges, and sale of assets are friendly in nature, which is to say that both sides have agreed to the combination or acquisition of assets.

Shareholder approval for an acquiring company is generally not required under state law or stock exchange regulations unless the acquisition is in the form of a stock transaction which would result in the issue of 20 percent or more of the acquirer's outstanding shares or voting power, or unless the two entities involved require that shareholders approve the deal. Under most state laws, however, a target company must submit merger agreements to a shareholder vote. Shareholder approval is required in the formation of a consolidated corporation.

### 7a. Mergers and Acquisitions

M&A analyses are inherently a balance of competing factors. Bright line rules are difficult if not impossible to apply to a world where every deal is different. Ultimately, the question for shareholders (both of the acquirer and the target) is the following: Is the valuation fair? Shareholders of the acquirer may be concerned that the deal values the target too highly. Shareholders of the target may be concerned that the deal undervalues their interests.

Vote recommendation will be based on primarily an analysis of shareholder value, which itself can be affected by ancillary factors such as the negotiation process. The importance of other factors, including corporate governance and social and environmental considerations however, should not fail to be recognized.



**Boston Trust Walden Recommendation:** Votes on mergers and acquisitions are considered on a case-by-case basis. A review and evaluation of the merits and drawbacks of the proposed transaction is conducted, balancing various and sometimes countervailing factors including:

- › *Valuation* - is the value to be received by the target shareholders (or paid by the acquirer) reasonable? While the fairness opinion may provide an initial starting point for assessing valuation reasonableness, emphasis is placed on the offer premium, market reaction and strategic rationale;
- › *Market reaction* - how has the market responded to the proposed deal? A negative market reaction *should cause closer scrutiny of a deal*;
- › *Strategic rationale* - *does the deal make sense strategically? From where is the value derived?* Cost and revenue synergies should not be overly aggressive or optimistic, but reasonably achievable. Management should also have a favorable track record of successful integration of historical acquisitions;
- › *Negotiations and process* - were the terms of the transaction negotiated at arm's-length? Was the process fair and equitable?
- › *Conflicts of interest* - are insiders benefiting from the transaction disproportionately and inappropriately as compared to non-insider shareholders?
- › *Governance* - will the combined company have a better or worse governance profile than the current governance profiles of the respective parties to the transaction?
- › *Stakeholder impact* - impact on community stakeholders and workforce including impact on stakeholders, such as job loss, community lending, equal opportunity, impact on environment etc.

Votes on Special Purpose Acquisition Corporation (SPAC) mergers and acquisitions are considered on a case-by-case basis taking into account: a) valuation; b) market reaction; c) deal timing; d) negotiations and process; e) conflicts of interest; f) voting agreements; and g) post-merger governance.

## 7b. Corporate Reorganization/Restructuring Plans (Bankruptcy)

The 2008 financial crisis placed Chapter 11 bankruptcy reorganizations as a potential alternative for distressed companies. The prevalence of these reorganizations can vary year over year due to, among other things, market conditions and a company's ability to sustain its operations. Additionally, the amount of time that lapses between a particular company's entrance into Chapter 11 and its submission of a plan of reorganization varies significantly depending on the complexity, timing, and jurisdiction of the particular case. These plans are often put to a vote of shareholders (in addition to other interested parties), as required by the Bankruptcy Code.

► **Boston Trust Walden Recommendation:** Vote case-by-case on proposals to common shareholders on bankruptcy plans of reorganization, considering the following factors including, but not limited to:

- › Estimated value and financial prospects of the reorganized company;
- › Percentage ownership of current shareholders in the reorganized company;
- › Whether shareholders are adequately represented in the reorganization process (particularly through the existence of an Official Equity Committee);
- › The cause(s) of the bankruptcy filing, and the extent to which the plan of reorganization addresses the cause(s);
- › Existence of a superior alternative to the plan of reorganization;
- › Governance of the reorganized company.

## 7c. Spin-offs

► **Boston Trust Walden Recommendation:** Votes on spin-offs should be considered on a case-by-case basis depending on the tax and regulatory advantages, planned use of sale proceeds, valuation of spinoff, fairness opinion, benefits to the parent company, conflicts of interest, managerial incentives, corporate governance changes, changes in the capital structure.

## 7d. Asset Purchases

► **Boston Trust Walden Recommendation:** Votes on asset purchase proposals should be made on a case-by-case after considering the purchase price, fairness opinion, financial and strategic benefits, how the deal was negotiated, conflicts of interest, other alternatives for the business, non-completion risk.

## 7e. Asset Sales

► **Boston Trust Walden Recommendation:** Votes on asset sales should be made on a case-by-case basis after considering the impact on the balance sheet/working capital, value received for the asset, potential elimination of diseconomies, anticipated financial and operating benefits, anticipated use of funds, fairness opinion, how the deal was negotiated, and conflicts of interest.


## 7f. Liquidations

► **Boston Trust Walden Recommendation:** Votes on liquidations should be made on a case-by-case basis after reviewing management's efforts to pursue other alternatives, appraisal value of assets, and the compensation plan for executives managing the liquidation. Vote for the liquidation if the company will file for bankruptcy if the proposal is not approved.

## 7g. Joint Ventures

► **Boston Trust Walden Recommendation:** Vote case-by-case on proposals to form joint ventures, taking into account percentage of assets/business contributed, percentage ownership, financial and strategic benefits, governance structure, conflicts of interest, other alternatives and non-completion risk.


## 7h. Going Private/Dark Transactions (Leveraged buyouts and Minority Squeeze-outs)

-  **Boston Trust Walden Recommendation:** Vote case-by-case on going private transactions, taking into account the following: offer price/premium, fairness opinion, how the deal was negotiated, conflicts of interest, other alternatives/offers considered, and non-completion risk.

Vote case-by-case on “going dark” transactions, determining whether the transaction enhances shareholder value by taking into consideration:

- › Whether the company has attained benefits from being publicly-traded (examination of trading volume, liquidity, and market research of the stock);
- › Balanced interests of continuing vs. cashed-out shareholders, taking into account the following:
  - › Are all shareholders able to participate in the transaction?
  - › Will there be a liquid market for remaining shareholders following the transaction?
  - › Does the company have strong corporate governance?
  - › Will insiders reap the gains of control following the proposed transaction?
  - › Does the state of incorporation have laws requiring continued reporting that may benefit shareholders?

## 7i. Private Placements/Warrants/Convertible Debentures

-  **Boston Trust Walden Recommendation:** Vote case-by-case on proposals regarding private placements taking into consideration:

- › Dilution to existing shareholders' position.
  - › The amount and timing of shareholder ownership dilution should be weighed against the needs and proposed shareholder benefits of the capital infusion.
- › Terms of the offer - discount/premium in purchase price to investor, including any fairness opinion; conversion features; termination penalties; exit strategy.
  - › The terms of the offer should be weighed against the alternatives of the company and in light of company's financial issues.
  - › When evaluating the magnitude of a private placement discount or premium, Boston Trust Walden will consider whether it is affected by liquidity, due diligence, control and monitoring issues, capital scarcity, information asymmetry and anticipation of future performance.
- › Financial issues include but are not limited to examining the following: a) company's financial situation; b) degree of need for capital; c) use of proceeds; d) effect of the financing on the company's cost of capital; e) current and proposed cash burn rate; and f) going concern viability and the state of the capital and credit markets.
- › Management's efforts to pursue alternatives and whether the company engaged in a process to evaluate alternatives. A fair, unconstrained process helps to ensure the best price for shareholders. Financing alternatives can include joint ventures, partnership, merger or sale of part or all of the company.
  - › Control issues including: a) Change in management; b) change in control; c) guaranteed board and committee seats; d) standstill provisions; e) voting agreements; f) veto power over certain corporate actions.
  - › Minority versus majority ownership and corresponding minority discount or majority control premium
  - › Conflicts of interest
    - › Conflicts of interest should be viewed from the perspective of the company and the investor.
    - › Were the terms of the transaction negotiated at arm's-length? Are managerial incentives aligned with shareholder interests?
  - › Market reaction
    - › The market's response to the proposed deal. A negative market reaction is a cause for concern. Market reaction may be addressed by analyzing the one day impact on the unaffected stock price.

Vote for the private placement if it is expected that the company will file for bankruptcy if the transaction is not approved.

## 7j. Formation of Holding Company



### **Boston Trust Walden Recommendation:**

- › Vote case-by-case on proposals regarding the formation of a holding company, taking into consideration: a) the reasons for the change; b) any financial or tax benefits; c) regulatory benefits; d) increases in capital structure; and e) changes to the articles of incorporation or bylaws of the company.
- › Vote against the formation of a holding company, absent compelling financial reasons to support the transaction, if the transaction would include either: a) increases in common or preferred stock in excess of the allowable maximum; or b) adverse changes in shareholder rights.

## 7k. Value Maximization Shareholder Proposals



**Boston Trust Walden Recommendation:** Vote case-by-case on shareholder proposals seeking to maximize shareholder value by hiring a financial advisor to explore strategic alternatives, selling the company or liquidating the company and distributing the proceeds to shareholders. These proposals should be evaluated based on the following factors:

- › Prolonged poor performance with no turnaround in sight;
- › Signs of entrenched board and management;
- › Strategic plan in place for improving value;
- › Likelihood of receiving reasonable value in a sale or dissolution;
- › Whether company is actively exploring its strategic options, including retaining a financial advisor.

## 8. SOCIAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL PROPOSALS

Environmental and Social (E&S) shareholder resolutions are receiving a great deal more attention from institutional shareholders today than they have in the past. In addition to the moral and ethical considerations intrinsic to many of these proposals, there is a growing recognition of their potential impact on the economic performance of the company. Among the reasons for this change are:

- › The number and variety of shareholder resolutions on social and environmental issues has increased;
- › Many of the sponsors and supporters of these resolutions are large institutional shareholders with significant holdings, and therefore, greater direct influence on the outcomes;
- › The proposals are more sophisticated – better written, more focused, and more sensitive to the feasibility of implementation;
- › Investors better understand that a company's response to social and environmental issues can have serious economic consequences for the company and its shareholders.
- › Corporate leaders increasingly make the case that good ESG performance contributes to long-term shareholder value.



**Boston Trust Walden Recommendation:** Generally vote for social and environmental shareholder proposals that promote good E&S performance while enhancing long-term shareholder and stakeholder value. Vote for disclosure reports that seek additional information particularly when it appears companies have not adequately addressed shareholders' E&S concerns. In determining vote recommendations, Boston Trust Walden will analyze the following factors:

- › Whether the proposal itself is well framed and reasonable;
- › Whether adoption of the proposal would have either a positive or negative impact on the company's short-term or long-term share value;
- › Whether the company's analysis and voting recommendation to shareholders is persuasive;
- › The degree to which the company's stated position on the issues could affect its reputation or sales, or leave it vulnerable to boycott or selective purchasing;
- › Whether the subject of the proposal is best left to the discretion of the board;
- › Whether the issues presented in the proposal are best dealt with through legislation, government regulation, or company-specific action;
- › The company's approach compared with its peers or any industry standard practices for addressing the issue(s) raised by the proposal;
- › Whether the company has already responded in an appropriate or sufficient manner to the issue(s) raised in the proposal;
- › If the proposal requests increased disclosure or greater transparency, whether or not sufficient information is publically available to shareholders and whether it would be unduly burdensome for the company to compile and avail the requested information to shareholders in a more comprehensive or amalgamated fashion;
- › Whether implementation of the proposal would achieve the objectives sought in the proposal.

In general, Boston Trust Walden supports proposals that request the company to furnish information helpful to shareholders in evaluating the company's operations. In order to be able to intelligently monitor their investments shareholders often need information best provided by the company in which they have invested. Requests to report such information will merit support. Requests to establish special committees of the board to address broad corporate policy and provide forums for ongoing dialogue on issues including, but not limited to shareholder relations, the environment, human rights, occupational health and safety, and executive compensation, will generally be considered on a case-by-case basis. We will closely evaluate proposals that ask the company to cease certain actions that the proponent believes are harmful to society or some segment of society with special attention to the company's legal and ethical obligations, its ability to remain profitable, and potential negative publicity if the company fails to honor the

request. Boston Trust Walden supports shareholder proposals that improve the company's public image, and reduce exposure to liabilities.

## 8a. Diversity and Equality

Significant progress has been made in recent years in the advancement of women and racial minorities in the workplace and the establishment of greater protections against discriminatory practices in the workplace. In the U.S., there are many civil rights laws that are enforced by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. The Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex and nationality. However, discrimination on the basis of race, gender, religion, nationality, and sexual orientation and gender identity continues. The SEC's revised disclosure rules now require information on how boards factor diversity into the director nomination process, as well as disclosure on how the board assesses the effectiveness of its diversity policy. Shareholder proposals on diversity may target a company's board nomination procedures or seek greater disclosure on a company's programs and procedures on increasing the diversity of its workforce, and make reference to one or more of the following points:

- › Violations of workplace anti-discrimination laws lead to expensive litigation and damaged corporate reputations that are not in the best interests of shareholders;
- › Employers already prepare employee diversity reports for the EEOC, so preparing a similar report to shareholders can be done at minimal cost;
- › The presence of women, ethnic minorities and union members in workforce and customer pools gives companies with diversified boards a practical advantage over their competitors as a result of their unique perspectives;
- › Efforts to include women, minorities and union representatives on corporate boards can be made at reasonable costs;
- › Reports can be prepared "at reasonable expense" describing efforts to encourage diversified representation on their boards;
- › Board diversification increases the pool of the company's potential investors because more and more investors are favoring companies with diverse boards;
- › A commitment to diversity in the workforce can contribute to superior financial returns.

### 8a-1. Add Women and Minorities to the Board

Board diversification proposals ask companies to put systems in place to increase the representation of women, racial minorities, union members or other underrepresented minority groups on boards of directors. In prior years, board diversification proposals requested that companies nominate board members from certain constituencies, appoint special committees to recommend underrepresented classes of board members, establish board positions reserved for representatives of certain groups, or simply "make greater efforts" to nominate women and ethnic minorities to their boards.



#### **Boston Trust Walden Recommendation:**

- › Vote for shareholder proposals that ask the company to take steps to nominate more women and racial minorities to the board.
- › Vote for shareholder proposals asking for reports on board diversity.
- › Vote for shareholder proposals asking companies to adopt nomination charters or amend existing charters to include reasonable language addressing diversity.
- ›

### 8a-2. Prepare Report/Promote EEOC-Related Activities

Filers of proposals on this issue generally ask a company to make available, at reasonable cost and omitting proprietary information, data the company includes in its annual report to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) outlining the make-up of its workforce by race, gender and position. Shareholders also ask companies to report on any

efforts they are making to advance the representation of women and ethnic minorities in jobs in which they have been historically underrepresented, such as sales and management. The costs of violating federal laws that prohibit discrimination by corporations are high and can affect corporate earnings. Overall, workforce composition data improves risk and opportunity assessments associated with human capital management. The Equal Opportunities Employment Commission does not release the companies' filings to the public, unless it is involved in litigation, and this information is difficult to obtain from other sources. Companies need to be sensitive to minority employment issues as the new evolving work force becomes increasingly diverse. This information can be provided with little cost to the company and does not create an unreasonable burden on management.

 **Boston Trust Walden Recommendation:**

- › Vote for shareholder proposals that ask the company to report on its diversity and/or affirmative action programs.
- › Vote for shareholder proposals calling for legal and regulatory compliance and public reporting related to non-discrimination, affirmative action, workplace health and safety, and labor policies and practices that effect long-term corporate performance.
- › Vote for shareholder proposals requesting nondiscrimination in salary, wages and all benefits.
- › Vote case-by-case on shareholder proposals calling for action on equal employment opportunity and antidiscrimination.


### **8a-3. Prohibit Discrimination based on Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity or Expression**

Federal law does not ban workplace discrimination against gay and lesbian employees, and only some states have enacted workplace protections for these employees. Although an increasing number of US companies have explicitly banned discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation and gender identity or expression in their equal employment opportunity (EEO) statements, many still do not. Shareholder proposals on this topic ask companies to change the language of their EEO statements in order to put in place anti-discrimination protection for their gay and lesbian employees. In addition, proposals may seek disclosure on a company's general initiatives to create a workplace free of discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, including reference to such items as support of gay and lesbian employee groups, diversity training that addresses sexual orientation, and non-medical benefits to domestic partners of gay and lesbian employees.

 **Boston Trust Walden Recommendation:**

- › Vote for shareholder proposals to include language in EEO statements specifically barring discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation or gender identity.
- › Vote against shareholder proposals that seek to eliminate protection already afforded to gay and lesbian employees.

### **8a-4. Report and Assessment on Pay Gap**

-  **Boston Trust Walden Recommendation:** Generally vote for shareholder proposals to assess or report on pay gap associated with gender, race, or ethnicity.

### **8a-5. Mandatory Arbitration**

In recent years, with the rise in employment litigation, many employers have turned to mandatory arbitration agreements. They argue that arbitration is a quicker and more cost-efficient way of resolving employment disputes. Those against the use of this practice argue that mandatory arbitration agreements preclude employees from suing in court for violations like wage theft, discrimination and sexual harassment, and instead require them to submit to private arbitration, which has been found to favor companies and discourage claims.

- **Boston Trust Walden Recommendation:** Generally vote for shareholder proposals asking to prepare reports on a company's use of mandatory arbitration on employment-related claims.

## 8a-6. Sexual Harassment

Sexual harassment in the workplace is a serious form of employment discrimination with the potential for significant legal, human capital, and reputational costs to a company. Sexual harassment claims can damage a company's reputation, alienate its employees and customers, and can be a marker for poor corporate governance.

- **Boston Trust Walden Recommendation:** Generally vote for shareholder proposals asking to prepare reports on company actions taken to strengthen policies and oversight to prevent workplace sexual harassment, or a report on risks posed by a company's failure to prevent workplace sexual harassment.

## 8b. Labor and Human Rights

Investors, international human rights groups, and labor advocacy groups have long been making attempts to safeguard worker rights in the international marketplace. In instances where companies themselves operate factories in developing countries for example, these advocates have asked that the companies adopt global corporate standards that guarantee sustainable wages and safe working conditions for their workers abroad. Companies that contract out portions of their manufacturing operations to foreign companies have been asked to ensure that the products they receive from those contractors have not been made using forced labor, child labor, or sweatshop labor. These companies are asked to adopt formal vendor standards that, among other things, include some sort of monitoring mechanism. Globalization, relocation of production overseas, and widespread use of subcontractors and vendors, often make it difficult to obtain a complete picture of a company's labor practices in global markets. Recent deadly accidents at factories, notably in Bangladesh and in Pakistan, have continued to intensify these concerns. Many investors believe that companies would benefit from adopting a human rights policy based on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Labour Organization's Core Labor Standards. Efforts that seek greater disclosure on a company's global labor practices, including its supply chain, and that seek to establish minimum standards for a company's operations will be supported. In addition, requests for independent monitoring of overseas operations will be supported.

Boston Trust Walden generally supports proposals that call for the adoption and/or enforcement of principles or codes relating to countries in which there are systematic violations of human rights; such as the use of slave, child, or prison labor; a government that is illegitimate; or there is a call by human rights advocates, pro-democracy organizations, or legitimately-elected representatives for economic sanctions. The use of child, sweatshop, or forced labor is unethical and can damage corporate reputations. Poor labor practices can lead to litigation against the company, which can be costly and time consuming.

### 8b-1. Codes of Conduct and Vendor Standards

In recent years, an increasing number of shareholder proposals have been submitted that pertain to the adoption of codes of conduct or provision, greater disclosure on a company's international workplace standards, or that request human rights risk assessment. Companies have been asked to adopt a number of different types of codes, including a workplace code of conduct, standards for international business operations, human rights standards, International Labour Organization (ILO) standards and the SA 8000 principles. The ILO is an independent agency of the United Nations which consists of 185 member nations represented by workers, employers, and governments. The ILO's general mandate is to promote a decent workplace for all individuals. The ILO sets international labor standards in the form of its conventions and then monitors compliance with the standards. The seven conventions of the ILO fall under four broad categories: Right to organize and bargain collectively, Nondiscrimination in employment, Abolition of forced


labor, and End of child labor. Each of the 185 member nations of the ILO is bound to respect and promote these rights to the best of their abilities. SA 8000 is a set of labor standards, based on the principles of the ILO conventions and other human rights conventions, and covers eight workplace conditions, including: child labor, forced labor, health and safety, freedom of association and the right to collective bargaining, discrimination, disciplinary practices, working hours and compensation. More recently, the Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, endorsed by the United Nation's Human Rights Council in 2011, provide a framework for understanding and assessing how companies address human rights concerns.

 **Boston Trust Walden Recommendation:**

- › Vote for shareholder proposals to implement human rights standards and workplace codes of conduct.
- › Vote for shareholder proposals calling for the implementation and reporting on ILO codes of conduct, SA 8000 Standards, or the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights..
- › Vote for shareholder proposals that call for the adoption of principles or codes of conduct relating to company investments in countries with patterns of human rights abuses (e.g. Burma and China).
- › Vote case-by-case on shareholder proposals that call for independent monitoring programs in conjunction with local and respected religious and human rights groups to monitor supplier and licensee compliance with codes.
- › Vote for shareholder proposals that seek publication of a "Code of Conduct" by the company's foreign suppliers and licensees, requiring that they satisfy all applicable standards and laws protecting employees' wages, benefits, working conditions, freedom of association, and other rights.
- › Vote for proposals requesting that a company conduct an assessment of the human rights risks in its operations or in its supply chain, or report on its human rights risk assessment process.
- › Vote for shareholder proposals seeking reports on, or the adoption of, vendor standards including: reporting on incentives to encourage suppliers to raise standards rather than terminate contracts and providing public disclosure of contract supplier reviews on a regular basis.


## 8b-2. Adopt/Report on Holy Land Principles

These resolutions have called for the adoption of the Holy Land Principles for operations located in Israel. They request companies operating abroad to support the equal employment opportunity policies that apply in facilities they operate domestically. The principles were established to address the sectarian hiring problems between Arabs and Non-Arabs in Israel. It is well documented that Israel's Arab community faced much higher unemployment figures than the Non-Arab community. Some human rights organizations and investors question the efficacy of adopting the Holy Land Principles while others believe the principles will promote equal hiring practices.

 **Boston Trust Walden Recommendation:** Generally abstain but consider case-by-case shareholder proposals to report on or implement the Holy Land Principles.

## 8b-3. Community Impact Assessment/Indigenous Peoples' Rights

In recent years, a number of U.S. public companies have found their operations or expansion plans in conflict with local indigenous groups. In order to improve their standing with indigenous groups and decrease any negative publicity companies may face, some concerned shareholders have sought reports requesting that companies review their obligations, actions and presence on these groups. Some have also requested these companies adopt policies based on the Draft UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples and the Organization of American States' (OAS) American Declaration on rights of Indigenous Peoples. Shareholders, concerned with the negative impact that the company's operations may have on the indigenous people's land and community, have sought reports detailing the impact of the company's actions and presence on these groups.


 **Boston Trust Walden Recommendation:** Vote for shareholder proposals asking to prepare reports on a company's environmental and health impact on communities, including indigenous peoples.

## 8b-4. Operations in High Risk Markets

In recent years, shareholder advocates and human rights organizations have highlighted concerns associated with companies operating in regions that are politically unstable, including state sponsors of terror. The U.S. government has active trade sanction regimes in place against a number of countries, including Cuba, Iran, North Korea, Sudan, and Syria, among others. These sanctions are enforced by the Office of Foreign Assets Control, which is part of the U.S. Department of the Treasury. However, these countries do not comprise an exhaustive list of countries considered to be high-risk markets.

Shareholder proponents have filed resolutions addressing a variety of concerns around how investments and operations in high-risk regions may support, or be perceived to support, potentially oppressive governments. Proponents contend that operations in these countries may lead to potential reputational, regulatory, and/or supply chain risks as a result of operational disruptions. Concerned shareholders have requested investment withdrawals or cessation of operations in high-risk markets as well as reports on operations in high-risk markets. Such reports may seek additional disclosure from companies on criteria employed for investing in, continuing to operate in, and withdrawing from specific countries.


Depending on the country's human rights record, investors have also asked companies to refrain from commencing new projects in the country of concern until improvements are made. In addition, investors have sought greater disclosure on the nature of a company's involvement in the country and on the impact of their involvement or operations.

 **Boston Trust Walden Recommendation:** Vote for requests for a review of and a report outlining the company's potential financial and reputation risks associated with operations in "high-risk" markets, such as a terrorism-sponsoring state or otherwise, taking into account:

- › The nature, purpose, and scope of the operations and business involved that could be affected by social or political disruption;
- › Current disclosure of applicable risk assessment(s) and risk management procedures;
- › Compliance with U.S. sanctions and laws;
- › Consideration of other international policies, standards, and laws;
- › Whether the company has been recently involved in significant controversies or violations in "high-risk" markets.

### 8b-4(a). Reports on Operations in Burma/Myanmar

Since the early 1960s, Burma (also known as Myanmar) has been condemned for human rights abuses, including slave labor, torture, rape and murder. Many companies have pulled out of Burma over the past decade given the controversy surrounding involvement in the country. Oil companies continue to be the largest investors in Burma and therefore are the usual recipients of shareholder proposals on this topic. However, proposals have also been filed at other companies, including financial companies, for a review of their involvement in the country.

 **Boston Trust Walden Recommendation:**

- › Vote for shareholder proposals to adopt labor standards in connection with involvement in Burma.
- › Vote for shareholder proposals seeking reports on Burmese operations and reports on costs of continued involvement in the country.

### 8b-4(b). Reports on Operations in China

Documented human rights abuses in China continue to raise concerns among investors, specifically with respect to alleged use of prison and child labor in manufacturing. Reports have identified U.S. companies with direct or indirect ties to companies controlled by the Chinese military, the People's Liberation Army (PLA), and hence links to prison labor. The U.S. Business Principles for Human Rights of Workers in China may help a company with operations in China avoid being blacklisted by U.S. states and municipalities, many of whom have limited their contracts with companies that fail to adopt similar principles in other countries recognized for committing gross human rights violations.

 **Boston Trust Walden Recommendation:**

- › Vote for shareholder proposals requesting more disclosure on a company's involvement in China
- › Vote case-by-case on shareholder proposals that ask a company to terminate a project or investment in China.

### **8b-4(c). Product Sales to Repressive Regimes**

Certain Internet technology companies have been accused of assisting repressive governments in violating human rights through the knowing misuse of their hardware and software. In particular, human rights groups have accused some technology companies of allowing the Chinese government to censor and track down dissenting voices on the internet.

 **Boston Trust Walden Recommendation:**

- › Vote case-by-case on shareholder proposals requesting that companies cease product sales to repressive regimes that can be used to violate human rights.
- › Vote for proposals to report on company efforts to reduce the likelihood of product abuses in this manner.


### **8b-4(d). Internet Privacy/Censorship and Data Security**

Information technology sector companies have been at the center of shareholder advocacy campaigns regarding concerns over Internet service companies and technology providers' alleged cooperation with potentially repressive regimes, notably the Chinese government. Shareholder proposals have asked Internet service companies to take steps to stop abetting repression and censorship of the Internet and/or review their human rights policies taking this issue into consideration. Resolution sponsors generally argue that the Chinese government is using IT company technologies to track, monitor, identify, and, ultimately, suppress political dissent. In the view of proponents, this process of surveillance and associated suppression violates internationally accepted norms outlined in the U.N. Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

While early shareholder resolutions on Internet issues focused on censorship by repressive regimes and net neutrality, proponents have recently raised concerns regarding privacy and data security in the wake of increased breaches that result in the misuse of personal information. On Oct. 13, 2011, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) issued a guidance document about the disclosure obligations relating to cybersecurity risks and cyber incidents. In the document, the SEC references the negative consequences that are associated with cyber-attacks, such as: remediation costs, including those required to repair relationships with customers and clients; increased cyber-security protection costs; lost revenues from unauthorized use of the information or missed opportunities to attract clients; litigation; and reputational damage. The document says that while the federal securities laws do not explicitly require disclosure of cybersecurity risks and incidents, some disclosure requirements may impose an obligation on the company to disclose such information and provides scenarios where disclosure may be required.

More recently, data security has been the focus of media outlets and a public concern. Prominent retailers have been the targets of hackers looking to steal credit card numbers; an estimated 40 million customer credit and debit card accounts were stolen from just one large retailer in 2013. Such incidents preceded what many people consider the largest data security breach in the United States. In June 2013, major media outlets began releasing information about leaked classified documents disclosed by Edward Snowden, an NSA contractor. The documents revealed a government-

run Internet and telephone surveillance program aimed at collecting metadata. As part of this operation, the government is said to have obtained from major U.S. telecommunications companies the call records of their customers.

 **Boston Trust Walden Recommendation:** Vote case-by-case on resolutions requesting the disclosure and implementation of Internet privacy and censorship policies and procedures considering:

- › The level of disclosure of policies and procedures relating to privacy, freedom of speech, Internet censorship, and government monitoring of the Internet;
- › Engagement in dialogue with governments and/or relevant groups with respect to the Internet and the free flow of information;
- › The scope of business involvement and of investment in markets that maintain government censorship or monitoring of the Internet;
- › The market-specific laws or regulations applicable to Internet censorship or monitoring that may be imposed on the company; and
- › The level of controversy or litigation related to the company's international human rights policies and procedures.

## 8c. Environment

Proposals addressing environmental and energy concerns are plentiful, and generally seek greater disclosure on a particular issue or seek to improve a company's environmental practices in order to protect the world's natural resources. In addition, some proponents cite the negative financial implications for companies with poor environmental practices, including liabilities associated with site clean-ups and lawsuits, as well as arguments that energy efficient products and clean environmental practices are sustainable business practices that will contribute to long-term shareholder value. Shareholders proponents point out that the majority of independent atmospheric scientists agree that global warming poses a serious problem to the health and welfare of our planet, citing the findings of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). Shareholder activists argue that companies can report on their greenhouse gas emissions within a few months at reasonable cost. The general trend indicates a movement towards encouraging companies to have proactive environmental policies, focusing on maximizing the efficient use of non-renewable resources and minimizing threats of harm to human health or the environment.

### 8c-1. Environmental/Sustainability Reports

Shareholders may request general environmental disclosures or reports on a specific location/operation, often requesting that the company detail the environmental risks and potential liabilities of a specific project. Increasingly, companies have begun reporting on environmental and sustainability issues using the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) standards. The GRI was established in 1997 with the mission of developing globally applicable guidelines for reporting on economic, environmental, and social performance. The GRI was developed by Ceres, (formerly known as the Coalition for Environmentally Responsible Economies, CERES) in partnership with the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP).

 **Boston Trust Walden Recommendation:**

- › Vote for shareholder proposals seeking greater disclosure of significant environmental and social practices, and/or associated risks and liabilities.
- › Vote for shareholder proposals asking companies to report in accordance with the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI).
- › Vote for shareholder proposals seeking the preparation of sustainability reports.

### 8c-2. Climate Change/Greenhouse Gas Emissions

Climate change has emerged as the most significant environmental threat to the planet. Scientists generally agree that gases released by chemical reactions including the burning of fossil fuels contribute to a “greenhouse effect” that traps the planet’s heat. A scientific consensus exists that the Greenhouse Gases (GHG) produced by the industrial age have contributed to recent weather crises such as heat waves, rainstorms, melting glaciers, rising sea levels and receding coastlines. Shareholder proposals requesting companies to issue a report to shareholders, “at reasonable cost and omitting proprietary information,” on greenhouse gas emissions ask that the report include descriptions of corporate efforts to reduce emissions, companies’ financial exposure and potential liability from operations that contribute to global warming, their direct or indirect efforts to promote the view that global warming is not a threat, and their goals in reducing these emissions from their operations. Further, shareholder proponents request that companies adopt GHG emissions reductions goals consistent with IPCC guidance (i.e. science-based goals), entailing a 55 percent reduction in global GHG emissions by 2050 and reaching carbon neutrality by 2100. Shareholder proponents argue the scientific consensus that the burning of fossil fuels contributes significantly to global warming, that future legislation may make companies financially liable for their contributions to global warming, that companies face serious operational and physical risks if they fail to mitigate the negative impacts of climate change, and that a report on the company’s role in global warming can be assembled at reasonable cost.

 **Boston Trust Walden Recommendation:**

- › Vote for shareholder proposals seeking disclosure of liabilities or preparation of reports pertaining to global warming and climate change-related risks, such as financial, physical, or regulatory risks.
- › Vote for shareholder proposals calling for the reduction of GHG or adoption of science-based GHG goals in products and operations.
- › Vote for shareholder proposals seeking reports on responses to regulatory and public pressures surrounding climate change, and for disclosure of research that aided in setting company policies around climate change.
- › Vote for shareholder proposals requesting reports on greenhouse gas emissions from companies’ operations and/or products.

### 8c-3. Invest in Clean/Renewable Energy


Filers of proposals on renewable energy ask companies to increase their investment in renewable energy sources and to work to develop products that rely more on renewable energy sources. Increased use of renewable energy will reduce the negative environmental impact of fossil fuel companies and can be more economical than traditional, fossil-fuel generated electricity. In addition, as supplies of oil and coal exist in the earth in limited quantities, renewable energy sources represent a competitive, and some would argue essential, long-term business strategy.

 **Boston Trust Walden Recommendation:**

- › Vote for shareholder proposals seeking the preparation of a report on a company’s activities related to the development of renewable energy sources.
- › Vote case-by-case on shareholder proposals seeking increased investment in renewable energy sources, though generally vote for unless the terms of the resolution are overly restrictive and prescriptive.


### 8c-4. Energy Efficiency

Reducing the negative impact to the environment can be done through the use of more energy efficient practices and products. Shareholders propose that corporations should have energy efficient manufacturing processes and should market more energy efficient products.

-  **Boston Trust Walden Recommendation:** Vote for shareholder proposals requesting a report on company energy efficiency policies and/or goals.


### 8c-5. Hydraulic Fracturing

Shareholder proponents have elevated concerns on the use of hydraulic fracturing, an increasingly controversial process in which water, sand, and a mix of chemicals are blasted horizontally into tight layers of shale rock to extract natural gas. As this practice has gained more widespread use, environmentalists have raised concerns that the chemicals mixed with sand and water to aid the fracturing process can contaminate ground water supplies. Proponents of resolutions at companies that employ hydraulic fracturing are also concerned that wastewater produced by the process could overload the waste treatment plants to which it is shipped. Shareholders have asked companies that utilize hydraulic fracturing to report on the environmental impact of the practice, to disclose policies aimed at reducing hazards from the process, and to adopt best practices.

 **Boston Trust Walden Recommendation:** Vote for requests seeking greater transparency on the practice of hydraulic fracturing and its associated risks.

### 8c-6. Adopt a Comprehensive Recycling Policy


A number of companies have received proposals to step-up their recycling efforts, with the goal of reducing the company's negative impact on the environment and reducing costs over the long-term.

 **Boston Trust Walden Recommendation:**

- › Vote for shareholder proposals requesting the preparation of a report on the company's recycling efforts.
- › Generally vote for shareholder proposals that ask companies to increase their recycling efforts or to adopt a formal recycling policy.


### 8c-7. Water Use

Shareholders may ask for a company to prepare a report evaluating the business risks linked to water use and impacts on the company's supply chain, including subsidiaries and bottling partners. Such proposals also ask companies to disclose current policies and procedures for mitigating the impact of operations on local communities in areas of water scarcity.

 **Boston Trust Walden Recommendation:**

- › Vote for shareholder proposals seeking the preparation of a report on a company's risks linked to water use.
- › Vote for resolutions requesting companies to promote the "human right to water" as articulated by the United Nations.
- › Vote for shareholder proposals requesting that companies report on or adopt policies for water use that incorporate social and environmental factors.

### 8c-8. Palm Oil Sourcing

 **Boston Trust Walden Recommendation:** Vote for shareholder proposals calling for steps to ensure palm oil is sourced in a sustainable manner.

## 8d. Health and Safety

### 8d-1. Toxic Materials

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 **Boston Trust Walden Recommendation:**

- › Vote for shareholder proposals asking companies to report on policies and activities to ensure product safety.
- › Generally vote for shareholder proposals asking companies to disclose annual expenditures relating to the promotion and/or environmental cleanup of toxins.
- › Generally vote for shareholder proposals asking companies to report on the feasibility of removing, or substituting with safer alternatives, all “harmful” ingredients used in company products.

**8d-2. Product Safety** **Boston Trust Walden Recommendation:**

- › Generally vote for proposals requesting the company to report on or adopt consumer product safety policies and initiatives.
- › Generally vote for proposals requesting the study, adoption and/or implementation of consumer product safety programs in the company's supply chain.

**8d-3. Workplace/Facility Safety** **Boston Trust Walden Recommendation:**

- › Vote on shareholder proposals requesting workplace safety reports, including reports on accident risk reduction efforts on a case-by-case basis
- › Vote shareholder proposals requesting companies report on or implement procedures associated with their operations and/or facilities on a case-by-case basis.

**8d-4. Phase-out or Label Products Containing Genetically Engineered Ingredients**

Shareholders have asked companies engaged in the development of genetically modified agricultural products to adopt a policy of not marketing or distributing such products until “long term safety testing” demonstrates that they are not harmful to humans, animals or the environment. Until further long term testing demonstrates that these products are not harmful, companies in the restaurant and prepared foods industries have been asked to remove genetically altered ingredients from products they manufacture or sell, and label such products in the interim. Shareholders have also asked supermarket companies to do the same for their own private label brands.

 **Boston Trust Walden Recommendation:**

- › Vote on shareholder proposals to label products that contain genetically engineered products or products from cloned animals on a case-by-case basis.
- › Abstain from shareholder proposals that ask the company to phase out the use of genetically engineered ingredients in their products.
- › Vote for shareholder proposals that ask the company to report on the use of genetically engineered organisms in their products.
- › Vote on shareholder proposals asking for reports on the financial, legal, and operational risks posed by the use of genetically engineered organisms on a case-by-case basis.

**8d-5. Adopt Policy/Report on Drug Pricing**

Pharmaceutical drug pricing, both within the United States and internationally, has raised many questions of the companies that are responsible for creating and marketing these treatments. Shareholder proponents, activists and even some legislators have called upon drug companies to restrain pricing of prescription drugs.

The high cost of prescription drugs is a vital issue for senior citizens across the country. Seniors have the greatest need for prescription drugs, accounting for a significant portion of all prescription drug sales, but they often live on fixed incomes and are underinsured.

Proponents note that efforts to reign-in pharmaceutical costs will not negatively impact research and development (R&D) costs and that retail drug prices are consistently higher in the U.S. than in other industrialized nations. Pharmaceutical companies often respond that adopting a formal drug pricing policy could put the company at a competitive disadvantage.

Against the backdrop of the AIDS crisis in Africa, many shareholders have called on companies to address the issue of affordable drugs for the treatment of AIDS, as well as tuberculosis and malaria throughout the developing world. When analyzing such resolutions, consideration should be made of the strategic implications of pricing policies in the market.



**Boston Trust Walden Recommendation:**

- › Vote on shareholder proposals to prepare a report on drug pricing on a case-by-case basis.
- › Vote case-by-case on shareholder proposals to adopt a formal policy on drug pricing.
- › Generally vote for shareholder proposals that call on companies to develop a policy to provide affordable HIV, AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria drugs in third-world nations.
- › Generally vote for proposals asking for reports on the economic effects and legal risks of limiting pharmaceutical products to Canada or certain wholesalers.
- › Vote case-by-case on proposals requesting that companies adopt policies not to constrain prescription drug re-importation by limiting supplies to foreign markets.

## 8e. Animal Welfare

### 8e-1. Animal Rights/Testing

Shareholders and animal rights groups, including People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA), may file resolutions calling for the end to painful and unnecessary animal testing on laboratory animals by companies developing products for the cosmetics and medical supply industry. Companies can face boycotts as well as reputational risk if seen as outliers with respect to animal welfare concerns.



**Boston Trust Walden Recommendation:**

- › Vote on shareholder proposals that seek to limit unnecessary animal testing where alternative testing methods are feasible or not barred by law on a case-by-case basis.
- › Generally vote for shareholder proposals that ask companies to adopt or/and report on company animal welfare standards or animal-related risks.
- › Vote on shareholder proposals asking companies to report on the operational costs and liabilities associated with selling animals on a case-by-case basis.
- › Vote case-by-case on shareholder proposals to eliminate cruel product testing methods.
- › Vote on shareholder proposals that seek to monitor, limit, report, or eliminate the outsourcing of animal testing to overseas laboratories on a case-by-case basis.
- › Generally vote for shareholder proposals to adopt or adhere to a public animal welfare policy at both company and contracted laboratory levels.

## 8f. Political and Charitable Giving

### 8f-1. Lobbying Efforts

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Shareholders have asked companies to report on their lobbying efforts on proposed legislation or to refute established scientific research regarding climate change, the health effects of smoking, fuel efficiency standards etc. Proponents have pointed to potential legislation on climate change, the lethargic pace of improvements in fuel efficiency standards in the U.S. automotive industry, and the highly litigious nature surrounding the tobacco industry as rationales for greater transparency on corporate lobbying practices that would shed light on whether companies are acting in the best long-term interests of their shareholders. In addition, proponents often note the potential for public policy advocacy that is inconsistent with stated company policies (reputational risk) and operations (operational risk). Proponents of lobbying resolutions typically request enhanced disclosure of lobbying policies and expenditures, including a report on the policies and procedures related to lobbying, amounts used for various types of lobbying, and any membership or payments to a tax-exempt organization that writes and endorses model legislation.

 **Boston Trust Walden Recommendation:**

- › Vote for shareholder proposals asking companies to review and report on their lobbying activities, including efforts to challenge scientific research and influence governmental legislation.
- › Vote for proposals requesting information on a company's lobbying (including direct, indirect, and grassroots lobbying) activities, policies, or procedures.

## 8f-2. Political Contributions/Non-Partisanship

As evidenced by the U.S. Supreme Court's January 2010 decision in *Citizens United vs. Federal Election Commission* that lifted restrictions on corporate spending in federal elections, changes in legislation that governs corporate political giving have, rather than limiting such contributions, increased the potential for corporate contributions to the political process and the complexity of tracking such contributions.

Proponents of political spending resolutions generally call for enhanced disclosure of political contributions, including a report on the policies and procedures for corporate political campaign contributions and trade association expenditures, the respective amounts of such donations using company funds, or an assessment of the impacts of such contributions on the firm's image, sales and profitability. Shareholder advocates of these proposals are concerned with the lack of transparency on political giving and the increasing involvement and influence of corporations in the political process. In addition, proponents often note the potential for public policy advocacy that is inconsistent with stated company policies (reputational risk) and operations (operational risk).

 **Boston Trust Walden Recommendation:**

- › Vote for proposals calling for a company to disclose political and trade association contributions, unless the terms of the proposal are unduly restrictive.
- › Vote against proposals asking a company to refrain from making any political contributions.

## 8f-3. Charitable Contributions

Shareholder proponents of charitable-contributions related resolutions may seek greater disclosure on a company's charitable donations including dollar amounts, sponsorships, and policies on corporate philanthropy.

 **Boston Trust Walden Recommendation:**

- › Vote on shareholder resolutions seeking enhanced transparency on corporate philanthropy on a case-by-case basis.
- › Vote against shareholder proposals imposing charitable giving criteria or requiring shareholder ratification of grants.
- › Vote against shareholder proposals requesting that companies prohibit charitable contributions.

## 8f-4. Disclosure on Prior Government Service

Shareholders have asked companies to disclose the identity of any senior executive and/or other high-level employee, consultant, lobbyist, attorney, or investment banker who has served in government. Although the movement of individuals between government and the private sector may benefit both, the potential also exists for conflicts of interest, especially in industries that have extensive dealings with government agencies.

- **Boston Trust Walden Recommendation:** Vote on shareholder proposals calling for the disclosure of prior government service of the company's key executives on a case-by-case basis.

## 8g. Consumer Lending and Economic Development

### 8g-1. Adopt Policy/Report on Predatory Lending Practices

Predatory lending involves charging excessive fees to subprime borrowers without adequate disclosure. More specifically, predatory lending includes misleading subprime borrowers about the terms of a loan, charging excessive fees that are folded into the body of a refinancing loan, including life insurance policies or other unnecessary additions to a mortgage, or lending to homeowners with insufficient income to cover loan payments.

- **Boston Trust Walden Recommendation:** Vote for shareholder proposals seeking the development of a policy or preparation of a report to guard against predatory lending practices.

## 8h. Miscellaneous

### 8h-1. Anti-ESG Proposals

A number of 'anti-ESG' shareholder proposals have been filed at companies requesting increased disclosure. While these proposals' requests are very similar to those submitted by shareholder advocates within traditional ESG investor circles, the underlying motives for filing the proposals appear to be very different. In addition to charitable contribution proposals, anti-social proposals addressing climate change, sustainability, and conflicts of interest may be seen at shareholder meetings. Despite implicitly different motivations in some of these proposals, the underlying requests for increased disclosure, in some cases, may be worth shareholder support.

- **Boston Trust Walden Recommendation:**
- › Vote against shareholder proposals that do not advance ESG sustainability.
  - › Vote against anti-social shareholder proposals seeking a review or report on the company's charitable contributions.

### 8h-2. ESG Factors in Voting Proxy Resolutions

- **Boston Trust Walden Recommendation:** Vote for shareholder proposals asking investment fiduciaries to consider ESG in proxy voting (all ESG, climate, comp).

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